Models of Variability in Probabilistic Causal Judgments

Abstract

Most theories of causal reasoning aim to explain the central tendency of causal judgments. However, experimental studies show that causal judgments are quite variable. In this article, we report the results of an experiment using a novel repeated measures design that demonstrate the existence of meaningful (i.e., not noise-related) within-participant variability. Next, we introduce and assess multiple computational cognitive models that serve as potential accounts of the sources of variability and fit those models to the new empirical data. We find that the Bayesian Mutation Sampler has the best fit to the data and is able to account for a number of unusual features of the response distributions (e.g., bi-modality), supporting the view that the stochastic sampling mechanism it posits reflects the cognitive processes via which people draw causal inferences. Additionally, our findings suggest that incorporating ‘non-reasoning’ processes, such as rounding and guessing, can improve the ability of models of causal reasoning to account for the observed response distributions. Overall, the study highlights the potential of computational modeling of full response distributions to shed light on the underlying mechanisms of human causal reasoning and identifies promising directions for future research.