Moral Error Theory, Entailment and Presupposition

Kalf, Wouter Floris

doi:10.1007/s10677-013-9423-6

Cited by 7 publications

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“…Mackie (1977),Garner (1990),Joyce (2001),Streumer (2013a), and Olson (2014).2Olson (2014: 152-155) tries to reduce hypothetical reasons to the (empirically kosher) relation between desires and the means to their realisation.3 The hypothetical/categorical distinction comes from Kant, whoKorsgaard (2009) and others interpret as a constructivist. Note that moral error theorists see moral discourse as involving a metaphysically 'robust' categoricity, not something constructed from agency.4 For more on how might understand commitment, seeKalf (2013).…”

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confidence: 99%

Epistemology shmepistemology: moral error theory and epistemic expressivism

Ingram

2017

Inquiry

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Some philosophers object to moral error theory by arguing that there is a parity between moral and epistemic normativity. They maintain that moral and epistemic error theory stand or fall together, that epistemic error theory falls, and that moral error theory thus falls too. This paper offers a response to this objection on behalf of moral error theorists. I defend the view that moral and epistemic error theory do not stand or fall together by arguing that moral error theory can be sustained alongside epistemic expressivism. This unusual combination of theories can be underpinned by differences in the foundational norms that guide moral and epistemic inquiry. I conclude that the problem of epistemic normativity fails to show that it is compulsory for us to reject moral error theory.

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confidence: 99%