Motivating teammates: The leader’s choice between positive and negative incentives

Gürerk, Özgür; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rockenbach, Bettina

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2009.04.004

Cited by 55 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 82 publications

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“…Social psychologists define negative sanctions as deliberate acts that lead to unpleasant inner states that the punished person wants to avoid. Recent experimental studies show that subjects indeed often prefer non-punishment communities when they have the choice between punishment and non-punishment or reward institutions (Botelho et al, 2007;Gürerk et al, 2009;Sutter et al, 2010). Second, subjects may also fear to be exposed to unjustified punishment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social learning increases the acceptance and the efficiency of punishment institutions in social dilemmas

Gürerk

2013

Journal of Economic Psychology

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Endogenously chosen punishment institutions perform well in increasing contributions and long-term payoffs in social dilemma situations. However, they suffer from (a) initial reluctance of subjects to join the punishment institution and (b) initial efficiency losses due to frequent punishment. Here, we investigate the effects of social learning on the acceptence and the efficieny of a peer punishment institution in a community choice experiment. Subjects choose between communities with and without the possibility to punish peers before interacting in a repeated social dilemma situation. We find that providing participants with a social history -presenting the main results of an identical previous experiment conducted with different subjects -decreases the initial reluctance towards the punishment institution significantly. Moreover, with social history, cooperative groups reach the social optimum more rapidly and there is lower efficiency loss due to reduced punishment. Our findings shed light on the importance of social learning for the acceptance of seemingly unpopular but socially desirable mechanisms.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social learning increases the acceptance and the efficiency of punishment institutions in social dilemmas

Gürerk

2013

Journal of Economic Psychology

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“…Güth et al 2007 or Sutter andRivas 2014). Gürerk et al (2009) focus on leader's choice of reward or punishment in a simultaneous setting.…”

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“…This design feature is similar to Gürerk et al (2009) but differs from Sutter and Rivas (2014). 3 We use two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum (signed-rank) tests for between (within) treatment comparisons.…”

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Leadership with individual rewards and punishments

Gürerk

Lauer

Scheuermann

2018

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

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Abstract:In a public goods experiment, leaders with reward or punishment power induce higher team cooperation compared to leader-free teams without any reward or punishment possibilities. When equipped with reward or punishment instruments, however, leader-free teams perform as well as teams with leaders. We conclude that the instruments as such are more effective in fostering cooperation than a leader.

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“…Gürerk et al (2009) and Nosenzo and Sefton (2014) study team production games where, after all team members have made a contribution to team production and received an equal share of team output, one team member (the team leader) receives a monetary budget that she can use to inflict punishment or rewards. Their main interest is on the relative effectiveness of punishments versus rewards (punishments turn out to be more effective) and the endogenous choice of incentive instrument (teams learn to use punishment incentives).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Team incentives and leadership

Drouvelis

Nosenzo

Sefton

2017

Journal of Economic Psychology

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe study, experimentally, how two alternative incentive mechanisms affect team performance, and how a team chooses between alternative mechanisms. We study a group incentive mechanism, where team output is shared equally among team members, and a hierarchical mechanism team output is allocated by a team leader. Our experiment examines these mechanisms in both homogeneous teams, where workers have identical productivities and in heterogeneous teams, where workers vary in their productivity. Our results are robust to whether teams are homogeneous or heterogeneous. We find that output is higher when a leader has the power to allocate output, but this mechanism also generates large differences between earnings of leaders and other team members. When team members can choose how much of team output is to be shared equally and how much is to be allocated by a leader, they tend to restrict the leader's power to distributing less than half of the pie.

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Motivating teammates: The leader’s choice between positive and negative incentives

Cited by 55 publications

References 82 publications

Social learning increases the acceptance and the efficiency of punishment institutions in social dilemmas

Social learning increases the acceptance and the efficiency of punishment institutions in social dilemmas

Leadership with individual rewards and punishments

Team incentives and leadership

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