Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations

Ferris, John

doi:10.4324/9780203504420.ch4

Cited by 2 publications

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“…However, a force risks losing its dominance if it waits too long, and, given the effects of RMA, the period one can wait is shrinking. This means that decisions must increasingly be made even as new information is arriving, which is counter to how decision makers operated in the past (Ferris, 2009). This issue be understood through the concepts of Type-A and Type-B uncertainty.…”

Section: Real-time Decision Makingmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…To incorporate this into intelligence, a centralized intelligence database that serves as a hub for information must be created which allows various intelligence agencies to share information and intelligence products (Ferris, 2009). In doing so, agencies should be able to provide products as effectively and efficiently as possible when ordered to by customers.…”

Section: Flexible Command Structuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The problem with RMA, however, is that there is now an overabundance of information and the current methods used to determine what is useful for commanders and decision-makers cannot keep up (Betz, 2006;Betz, 2008;Ferris, 2009). This represents an issue in the intelligence process.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…RMA is based on an understanding that information gives forces an edge over their opponents, and the usage of technology allows this to happen at a faster pace than ever before (Lucas, 2010). The definition of RMA for this paper is adapted from Betz (2006) and Ferris (2009) to mean the usage of information technology by either state or non-state forces to achieve and maintain a force's dominance in warfare faster than their opponents can.The problem with RMA, however, is that there is now an overabundance of information and the current methods used to determine what is useful for commanders and decision-makers cannot keep up (Betz, 2006;Betz, 2008;Ferris, 2009). This represents an issue in the intelligence process.…”

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Applying the Revolution in Military Affairs to Intelligence

Kurliak¹

2018

JICW

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This paper identifies how the concept of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' can be applied to the intelligence process to address the overabundance of information produced by contemporary technologies. Three tenets from the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' are examined as possible remedies for failings in the intelligence process. Drawing on previous intelligence failures, the case is made that applying the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' will improve the intelligence process and allow for agencies to stay on top of the large quantity of information they handle. The finding is that by incorporating these tenets, intelligence services can improve the quality of intelligence that they produce. Keywords: Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), intelligence, informationThe concept of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA) goes back as early as the 1970s (Metz and Kievit, 1995), and theorizes that information technology is altering the "knowledge available to armed forces, and thus the nature of war" (Ferris, 2009, 455). RMA is based on an understanding that information gives forces an edge over their opponents, and the usage of technology allows this to happen at a faster pace than ever before (Lucas, 2010). The definition of RMA for this paper is adapted from Betz (2006) and Ferris (2009) to mean the usage of information technology by either state or non-state forces to achieve and maintain a force's dominance in warfare faster than their opponents can.The problem with RMA, however, is that there is now an overabundance of information and the current methods used to determine what is useful for commanders and decision-makers cannot keep up (Betz, 2006;Betz, 2008;Ferris, 2009). This represents an issue in the intelligence process. In response, the question has been asked, if there is a RMA relating to the way information and technology are changing war, can the same concept be applied to intelligence? This paper argues that the concept of RMA can be applied to intelligence to address the issue of information overabundance and the methods used to determine how useful information is. This can be accomplished by incorporating three elements into the intelligence process: flexible command

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Section: Real-time Decision Makingmentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: Flexible Command Structuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Applying the Revolution in Military Affairs to Intelligence

Kurliak¹

2018

JICW

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Field Operations as Information Warfare and Operationalisation of Theory

Gunneriusson

2017

New Security Challenges

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This chapter touches on concepts of information warfare, for example COIN-theory. Field theory as information warfare is the main topic. The purpose is to frame the field theory as a valid example of both method and theory regarding information warfare. This is especially important as a lot of the practice regarding information warfare is not anchored in a social theory but mostly in a best practice way of acting. That is all well but a theory provides a wider range of generalising and thus options of free-thinking.

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Netcentric Warfare, C4ISR and Information Operations

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Applying the Revolution in Military Affairs to Intelligence

Applying the Revolution in Military Affairs to Intelligence

Field Operations as Information Warfare and Operationalisation of Theory

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