New First-Order Secure AES Performance Records

Shahmirzadi, Aein Rezaei; Božilov, Dušan; Moradi, Amir

doi:10.46586/tches.v2021.i2.304-327

“…The implementation of MS-LW-TI is based on the Design Suite 14.7 with Xilinx Spartan-6 (XC6SLX75) FPGAs for S-boxes, which are used in the existing TI schemes [35,36]. When these TI schemes map a hardware design to an FPGA, the authors count the number of occupied slices as a metric for size.…”

Section: Performance Of Ms-lw-timentioning

confidence: 99%

MS-LW-TI: Primitive-Based First-Order Threshold Implementation for 4 × 4 S-boxes

Liu,

Tang

2024

IET Information Security

0

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Threshold implementation (TI) is a lightweight countermeasure against side-channel attacks when glitches happen. As to masking schemes, an S-box is the key part to protection. In this paper, we propose a general first-order lightweight TI scheme for 4 × 4 S-boxes and name it as MiniSat-lightweight-threshold implementation (MS-LW-TI). First, we use MiniSat to optimally decompose an S-box into the least number of three different logic gate operations, AND, OR, and XOR. Among these operations, we define two primitives and the extension of two primitives for TI design. Furthermore, we prove that the primitives and their extensions strictly comply with the security properties. Finally, we implement MS-LW-TI on Xilinx Spartan-6 Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) to show that the S-boxes of PRESENT, GIFT, and PICCOLO consume only 17, 15, and 13 look-up-tables (LUTs), 16, 9, and 16 flip-flops (FFs), 6, 5, and 6 slices, respectively. Compared with the existing lightweight TI design, our TI for PRESENT S-box has a 22%, 38%, and 25% reduction of LUTs, FFs, and slices to the design by Shahmirzadi and Moradi at IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (TCHES) 2021, and our TI for GIFT S-box has a 6%, 25%, and 28% reduction of LUTs, FFs, and slices to the design by Jati et al., which is the smallest.

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“…Unsurprisingly, TI schemes for AES and Keccak have enjoyed the most attention the literature. Recent works include [25,27,29] and [1,28] respectively.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improving First-Order Threshold Implementations of SKINNY

Caforio

¹

,

Collins

²

,

Glamočanin

³

et al. 2021

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Threshold Implementations have become a popular generic technique to construct circuits resilient against power analysis attacks. In this paper, we look to devise efficient threshold circuits for the lightweight block cipher family SKINNY. The only threshold circuits for this family are those proposed by its designers who decomposed the 8-bit S-box into four quadratic S-boxes, and constructed a 3-share byte-serial threshold circuit that executes the substitution layer over four cycles. In particular, we revisit the algebraic structure of the S-box and prove that it is possible to decompose it into (a) three quadratic S-boxes and (b) two cubic S-boxes. Such decompositions allow us to construct threshold circuits that require three shares and executes each round function in three cycles instead of four, and similarly circuits that use four shares requiring two cycles per round. Our constructions significantly reduce latency and energy consumption per encryption operation. Notably, to validate our designs, we synthesize our circuits on standard CMOS cell libraries to evaluate performance, and we conduct leakage detection via statistical tests on power traces on FPGA platforms to assess security. 1

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“…Unsurprisingly, TI schemes for AES and Keccak have enjoyed the most attention the literature. Recent works include [25,27,29] and [1,28] respectively.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revisiting the Security of COMET Authenticated Encryption Scheme

Gueron

¹

,

Jha

²

,

Nandi

³

2021

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

4

0

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Threshold Implementations have become a popular generic technique to construct circuits resilient against power analysis attacks. In this paper, we look to devise efficient threshold circuits for the lightweight block cipher family SKINNY. The only threshold circuits for this family are those proposed by its designers who decomposed the 8-bit S-box into four quadratic S-boxes, and constructed a 3-share byte-serial threshold circuit that executes the substitution layer over four cycles. In particular, we revisit the algebraic structure of the S-box and prove that it is possible to decompose it into (a) three quadratic S-boxes and (b) two cubic S-boxes. Such decompositions allow us to construct threshold circuits that require three shares and executes each round function in three cycles instead of four, and similarly circuits that use four shares requiring two cycles per round. Our constructions significantly reduce latency and energy consumption per encryption operation. Notably, to validate our designs, we synthesize our circuits on standard CMOS cell libraries to evaluate performance, and we conduct leakage detection via statistical tests on power traces on FPGA platforms to assess security. 1

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New First-Order Secure AES Performance Records

Cited by 9 publications

References 22 publications

MS-LW-TI: Primitive-Based First-Order Threshold Implementation for 4 × 4 S-boxes

MS-LW-TI: Primitive-Based First-Order Threshold Implementation for 4 × 4 S-boxes

Improving First-Order Threshold Implementations of SKINNY

Revisiting the Security of COMET Authenticated Encryption Scheme

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