Noncompliance risk, asymmetric power and the design of enforcement of the European economic governance

Franchino, Fabio; Mariotto, Camilla

doi:10.1177/14651165211023832

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 64 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This outcome is consistent with the political economy or political science literature looking at the background of different enforcement designs of supranational agencies. In particular, Franchino and Mariotto (2021) argue that EU governments anticipating a greater risk of non-compliance will prefer a soultion that offers greater discretion, and countries with higher voting power push for a stronger involvement of the Council.…”

Section: Survey On National Correction Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enforcement of Fiscal Rules: Lessons from the Fiscal Compact

Larch¹,

Busse

Jankovics

2021

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Survey On National Correction Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enforcement of Fiscal Rules: Lessons from the Fiscal Compact

Larch¹,

Busse

Jankovics

2021

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…It has also been suggested that the enforcement process is politicized and the strategic conduct of the Commission is influenced by political considerations (Cheruvu, 2022;Kelemen & Pavone, 2021;Toshkov, 2019). Such concerns have also been expressed with regard to the operation of other enforcement tools in the arsenal of the EU, namely those related to economic governance (the Stability and Growth Pact, SGP) (Franchino & Mariotto, 2021;van der Veer, 2022) and for enforcing rule of law in particular (Closa, 2019). This raises the question why the EU institutions do not use the full force of the enforcement tools at their disposal to punish states that do not comply with the EU treaties, laws and policies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Avoiding Public Backlash: Enforcing Rule of Law in the European Union

Toshkov¹,

Mazepus²,

Yordanova³

et al. 2022

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Effective enforcement is essential for international cooperation. Accordingly, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of formal tools for enforcing its laws and policies in the members states. The application of these tools, however, has been slow, timid and uneven. One of the possible reasons for this is the fear that enforcement by supranational institutions (the Commission and the Court of Justice of the EU) will provoke public backlash in the member states targeted by sanctions. Systematic empirical evidence for such effects of enforcement is, however, lacking. This paper develops hypotheses about the factors affecting the perceived legitimacy of enforcement actions. The hypotheses capture the possible influence of procedural fairness, descriptive norm prevalence, and the likely effects of the sanctions on the future of the EU. These hypotheses are tested with a survey experimental design administered to a nationally-representative sample (N=1,200) in Poland. The context of the study is the enforcement of rule of law, and the focus is on the substantial financial sanctions imposed by the EU with regard to judicial independence in particular. The results show that the perceived legitimacy of the enforcement actions is strongly related to exclusive national identity, the perceived importance of the rule of law as a norm, and partisan affiliations. We find some evidence that providing information about the prevalence of public support for judicial independence in the country increases significantly the perceived legitimacy of enforcement actions. No evidence is found about possible effects of information about Polexit, future deterrence effects of the sanctions or their procedural fairness or unfairness. Altogether, these results suggest that the perceived legitimacy of enforcement actions is very hard to be influenced when the issue at stake is relatively salient and politicized.

show abstract