Normative Uncertainty and the Dependence Problem

Abstract

In this paper, I enter the debate between those who hold that our normative uncertainty matters for what we ought to do, and those who hold that only our descriptive uncertainty matters. I argue that existing views in both camps have unacceptable implications in cases where our descriptive beliefs depend on our normative beliefs. I go on to propose a fix which is available only to those who hold that normative uncertainty matters, ultimately leaving the challenge as a threat to recent skepticism about such views.

Rational Moral Ignorance

“…All of the arguments in this paper that concern the translucent norm will apply equally to this view, too. See Hedden (2016), Kieswe er (2016), Podgorski (2020), or Johnson King (forthcoming) for further discussion.…”

“…460-463;2015, pp. 75-78), Podgorski (2020), Sepielli (2018), and Weatherson (ms., for relevant discussion. 2 One way to react is to deny the setup: Frances simply couldn't have been rational in believing as she did.…”

“…There is some tension here. 1 Moral ignorance has been discussed by several authors, including Arpaly andSchroeder (1999, 2014), Arpaly (2002Arpaly ( , 2003Arpaly ( , 2015, Rosen (2004), Sepielli (2009Sepielli ( , 2014Sepielli ( , 2016Sepielli ( , 2018, Zimmerman (2010), Harman (2011Harman ( , 2015, Weatherson (2015, ms.), Hedden (2016), Pi ard and Worsnip (2017), Johnson King (2020, forthcoming), and Podgorski (2020). This paper's focus is narrower-epistemically rational moral ignorance.…”

Is Normative Uncertainty Irrelevant if Your Descriptive Uncertainty Depends on It?

“…And this could be a serious problem for Excluders. Podgorski (2020) has argued that those wishing to treat normative uncertainty differently from descriptive uncertainty face a dependence problem because descriptive uncertainty can depend on normative uncertainty. MacAskill and Ord (2020) also object to Excluders using a case involving dependence.…”

Average Utilitarianism Implies Solipsistic Egoism

“…On the other hand, several of the objections to My Favourite Theory and normative externalism do seem to transfer-e.g. the problem of theory individuation for My Favourite Theory [MacAskill and Ord 2020: 334-5] and the 'dependence problem' for externalism[Podgorski 2020]. …”