Occupying Ukraine: Great Expectations, Failed Opportunities, and the Spoils of War, 1941–1943

Abstract

The attack against the Soviet Union was ideologically motivated, but the timing owed a great deal to military and economic considerations. German hopes largely focused on Ukraine, which was expected to be both a giant breadbasket and a reservoir of essential minerals. But plans for the economic exploitation of Ukraine were flawed from the beginning and remained inconsistent throughout the war. Substantial reconstruction efforts only began belatedly and were accompanied by brute force that combined economic logic with ideological zeal. The Nazi policies of racist repression and mass murder were, then, both a means of and an obstacle to exploitation of the East. Yet, they were also successful: without the raw materials obtained from Ukraine, the Nazi war machine would have likely ground to a halt well before 1945. The cost of sustaining the German war effort was consequently borne, to a large extent, by the local population, which labored under appalling conditions both in the Reich and in Ukraine itself.Dass der Angriff des nationalsozialistischen Deutschlands auf die UdSSR im Sommer 1941 den "Weltanschauungskrieg" eröffnete, ist bekannt. In seinem Schatten haben lange die engeren militärischen und vor allem ökonomischen Erwägungen gestanden, die "Operation Barbarossa" motivierten, insbesondere die Erwartung, einen autarken Großwirtschaftsraum zu schaffen. Im Zentrum dieser Erwartungen stand die Ukraine, die einerseits deindustrialisiert werden, andererseits Nahrungsmittel und Rohstoffe im Überfluss liefern sollte. Als diese Hoffnungen unerfüllt blieben, setzte ein verspäteter Kurswechsel zum industriellen Wiederaufbau ein. Dieser implizierte jedoch keineswegs einen Sieg ökonomischer Rationalität über ideologische Prärogativen. Vielmehr verhielten sich industrielle Ausbeutung und rassistische Gewalt komplementär und sicherten der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft bis 1945 zentrale Ressourcen, ohne welche die Rüstungsproduktion zusammengebrochen wäre. Den Preis zahlte die lokale Bevölkerung, die unter brutalen Bedingungen vor Ort wie auch im Reich für die deutschen Besatzer schuftete.

Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin’s ‘Terror by Hunger’

“…In the early stages of WWII, Germany had near-complete control over Ukraine, which obviated the local threat of Soviet retribution. In late 1943, as the tide of the war turned in Moscow's favor, locals saw the Red Army returning and state security services resurrecting the threat of Soviet coercion (Priemel, 2015). Since most of this era saw a low threat of Soviet retribution, we expect famine to have inflamed opposition to Red partisans, on average.…”

“…While the outlook in 1941 favored an eventual German victory (Overy 1998, 94–6), these expectations changed after Soviet successes in Stalingrad (February 1943) and Kursk (August 1943)—the latter being Germany’s final strategic offensive in the east. Germany’s weakened position soon became apparent to civilians, as occupying authorities began dismantling industrial installations and offered concessions—particularly in land use—to gain local support (Priemel 2015, 49). Ukrainians, in turn, interpreted these moves as a “sure sign that they’re taking to their heels” (Berkhoff 2008b, 139).…”

Supplementary material to "A comparison of estimates of global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil carbon sources"

“…The largest source of Soviet coal was in the industrial Donetsk region, and the city of Donetsk was almost completely destroyed and depopulated. Priemel (2015) describes how surprised the Germans were, when they arrived, to discover how fast the Soviets had progressed in building up the industry of the Eastern Ukraine, compared to the plans they had seen.…”