On cognitive busyness: When person perceivers meet persons perceived.

Abstract

Person perception includes three sequential processes: categorization (what is the actor doing?), characterization (what trait does the action Imply?), and correction (what situation*! constraints may have caused the action?). We argue that correction is less automatic (i.e., more easily disrupted) than either categorization or characterization. In Experiment l, subjects observed a target behave anxiously in an anxiety-provoking situation. In Experiment 2, subjects listened to a target read a political speech that he had been constrained to write. In both experiments, control subjects used information about situational constraints when drawing inferences about the target, but cognitively busy subjects (who performed an additional cognitive task during encoding) did not. The results (a) suggest that person perception is a combination of lower and higher order processes that differ in their susceptibility to disruption and (b) highlight the fundamental differences between active and passive perceivers.Many of us can recall a time when, as students, we encountered a professor at a party and were surprised to find that he or she seemed a very different sort of person than our classroom experience had led us to expect. In part, such discrepant impressions reflect real discrepancies in behavior: Professors may display greater warmth or less wit at a party than they do in the classroom. However, just as the object of perception changes across situations, so too does the perceiver. As passive perceivers in a classroom, we are able to observe a professor without concerning ourselves with the mechanics of social interaction. At a party, however, we are active perceivers, busy managing our impressions, predicting our partner's behavior, and evaluating alternative courses of action. Of all the many differences between active and passive perceivers, one seems fundamental: Active perceivers, unlike passive perceivers, are almost always doing several things at once (Gilbert,

Social cognition and the brain: A meta‐analysis

“…These theories emphasize the causal role of the actor in producing the behavior, unless external environmental factors constrain his or her freedom and mitigate his or her causal role. Perceivers automatically attribute the behavior to a correspondent trait of the actor, and discount the inference to the actor on the basis of situational circumstances if present and relevant [although this is sometimes done insufficiently; Gilbert and Malone, 1995;Gilbert et al, 1988;Trope and Gaunt, 2000]. This is typically seen as a high-level reflective reasoning process involving ''an iterative or even simultaneous evaluation of the various hypotheses before reaching a conclusion'' [Trope and Gaunt, 2000, p. 353].…”

Principles, processes, and puzzles of social cognition: An introduction for the special issue on social cognitive neuroscience

“…Combining the two explanations, it appears that dispositional attributions are automatically anchored onto the observed behavior and only adjusted to take account of situational factors if controlled processing resources are brought to bear on the attribution. Dual-process explanations have been generative in the study of persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986;Chaiken et al, 1989), stereotyping (Devine, 1989), attribution (Gilbert et al, 1988;Trope, 1986), and attitude and behavior consistency (Fazio and Towles-Schwen, 1999).…”

Chronic and temporary distinct expectancies as comparison standards: Automatic contrast in dispositional judgments.

“…If the behavior categorization and dispositional inference results reflect comparison-based processes, we should find no differences 7 We have chosen to conduct our path analyses in accord with past theory and research that suggests that when perceivers have a dispositional inference goal, they make behavior categorizations first and then form and evaluate dispositional inferences (Gilbert et al, 1988;Trope, 1986;Krull & Erickson, 1996). It is important to note, however, that the opposite direction of causality (i.e., that dispositional inferences are made first and cause behavior categorizations) cannot be ruled out in any of the current studies.…”

“…Despite this difference, both models assume that initial categorizations and dispositional inferences require relatively few cognitive resources and are followed by a more resourcedemanding attributional evaluation or correction stage wherein situational and other contextual information may be considered as alternative causes of the behavior. distraction or other manipulations designed to deplete attentional resources (Gilbert et al, 1988;Reeder, 1997). The earlier stages have been found, however, to be susceptible to influence by salient situational information (Trope & Gaunt, 1999) and by other contextually activated or chronically accessible knowledge structures (e.g., Reich & Weary, 1998;Weary & Reich, in press).…”

“…Almost without exception, attribution theorists and researchers have focused on the assimilative effects of contextual information on behavior categorization and characterization processes (Gilbert et al, 1988;Krull & Erickson, 1995;Reich & Weary, 1998;Trope, 1986;Trope & Alfieri, 1997;cf. Weary & Reich, in press).…”