On the Adoption Problem and Meta-Logical Monism

Abstract

According to the Adoption Problem (AP) certain basic logical principles cannot be adopted. Drawing on the AP, Suki Finn presents an argument against logical pluralism: Modus Ponens (MP) and Universal Instantiation (UI) both govern a general structure shared by every logical rule. As such, analogues of these two rules must be present in every meta-logic for any logical system L, effectively imposing a restriction to logical pluralism at the meta-level through their presence constituting a “meta-logical monism”. We find a tension in the dual role that the “unadoptable rules” must play in Finn’s “meta-logical monism” rendering it ineffective to restrict logical theories and systems. Consequently, we argue they cannot be both analogues of MP and UI and inferentially productive. We conclude with a series of suggestions regarding where a more satisfying and robust interpretation of the AP could lie.

Reglas lógicas y cambio de práctica inferencial

“…Por supuesto, hay cierto debate acerca de cuáles son estos principios. E incluso acerca de si este es realmente el punto central del problema de la adopción (Santelli, Toranzo Calderón, & Erenfryd, 2022). Pero el Modus Ponens, la Instanciación Universal, el principio de no contradicción son seguramente algunos de los principios o reglas que según Kripke y Padró están presupuestos en cualquier elaboración teórica acerca de cómo razonamos.…”