Online User Information Sharing and Government Pandemic Prevention and Control Strategies-Based on Evolutionary Game Model

Xiao, Yao; Xu, Wanting; Zeng, Shouzhen; Peng, Qiao

doi:10.3389/fpubh.2021.747239

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…Government media may improve public governance and make public conduct more controllable (21). By upgrading the disclosure method for personal outbreak information and increasing the rate of information sharing among internet users, the government has increased the efficiency of COVID-19 prevention and control (22).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improving the Communication and Credibility of Government Media in Response to Public Health Emergencies: Analysis of Tweets From the WeChat Official Accounts of 10 Chinese Health Commissioners

Wang

Zhong

et al. 2022

Front. Public Health

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BackgroundA significant public health emergency has appeared worldwide since the beginning of 2020. The spread of negative information about COVID-19 on social media poses a challenge and threat to public health disposition and the credibility of government public opinion.ObjectiveThis study aimed to analyze the rules and characteristics of government media in disseminating information on public emergencies. In addition, find ways and means to improve government media's communication power and credibility.MethodBased on relevant theories and measures of information econometrics, 10 WeChat official accounts of the Chinese government were taken as examples. The Python crawler tool was used to collect data of 10 WeChat official accounts-related tweets. In addition, this study used various tools, such as ROST, UCINET, and SPSS, for statistical analysis and co-word analysis of the data.ResultFrom January 17 to March 31, 2020, 6,612 COVID-19-related tweets were published by 10 WeChat official accounts, which broadcast epidemic overview, epidemic prevention and control, science and disinformation, epidemic assistance, epidemic impact, and negative impact. By analyzing the posting time and content of the tweets, we found that changes in the number of articles posted by the WeChat and changes in content and the progress of the COVID-19 pandemic are nearly synchronized, and most tweets are published at 8:00 am. Furthermore, based on the analytics of high dissemination index and high-frequency words, we propose that there is a significant correlation between the strength of independence and the credibility of the WeChat official account.ConclusionThe three elements of WeChat communication (value, interest, and moving) and the degree of independent innovation of public numbers impact the communication power and credibility of government media. First, if the articles published by the WeChat official account are valuable, interesting, and moving, the communication power of the WeChat official account would get more powerful. Second, increased ability for independent innovation has a positive impact on enhancing the WeChat official account's credibility. Third, government media can improve its governance effects of public health emergencies by enhancing their communication power and credibility.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improving the Communication and Credibility of Government Media in Response to Public Health Emergencies: Analysis of Tweets From the WeChat Official Accounts of 10 Chinese Health Commissioners

Wang

Zhong

et al. 2022

Front. Public Health

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“…From a microscopic vantage point, it is possible to examine the strategic decisions and evolutionary logic of many players in the control of ADR product quality. Evolutionary game theory has been utilized extensively in the disciplines of COVID-19 public health governance ( 49 ), free riders in healthcare policy ( 50 ), and COVID-19 information disclosure ( 17 ).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a result, those who self-test using substandard testing kits do not realize that their results may be misleading. Inaccurate self-testing results could cause SARS-CoV-2 to spread wider across the nation ( 16 , 17 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulating the product quality of COVID-19 antigen testing reagents: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis under China's legal framework

Huang

Wang²,

Feng³

et al. 2023

Front. Public Health

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Personal purchases of novel coronavirus antigen detection reagents (ADRs) for self-detection have contributed to the optimization of medical resources and containment of the COVID-19 pandemic. The recurring occurrence of false testing results in China has generated concerns regarding the quality of ADRs and the testing mechanism for medical devices. Academic viewpoints and remarks on the sensitivity, application possibilities, and product innovation of ADRs may be found in the extant scientific literature. However, the current research does not explore the microscopic product quality concerns that emerge throughout the production and marketing of ADRs. To explore strategic equilibrium circumstances and behavioral evolution processes, an evolutionary game model was developed to include ADR manufacturers, third-party medical device inspection agencies, and regulatory authorities. The results reveal that the quantity of illegal incentives, the cost of regulation, and the loss of government credibility have a major impact on the decisions of regulatory authorities and determine three potential systemic equilibrium states. To maximize social welfare, ADRs should be incorporated into China's medication price monitoring system in order to manage market prices. To cut regulatory expenses, the government should employ blockchain technology for traceable network regulation of ADR product quality. The government should also protect the people's right to free speech and encourage online reporting of adverse incidents caused by ADRs. The conclusions of this article can provide many developing nations with important insights for regulating the quality of ADR products.

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“…Akkaoui et al [26] verified the influence of blockchain technology on the trust level between different entities in a health data trading system through the evolutionary game model. Based on the evolutionary game model, Xiao et al [27] studied the behavior patterns of prevention and control between online users and the government in data sharing and information disclosure. Dong et al [28] introduced evolutionary game theory for cross-departmental sharing in digital government construction and constructed a game model between government data management departments and different government functions involved in cross-departmental data sharing.…”

Section: Data Sharing and Evolutionary Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Sharing Behavior Strategy of Cultural Heritage Institutions Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Cao

Yin

2023

Sustainability

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With the accelerated digitalization of China’s cultural heritage conservation, cultural heritage data sharing has been gaining more and more attention as an essential link in cultural heritage conservation and transmission. However, there are many problems in cultural heritage sharing, one of which is the low willingness of institutions to share among themselves and the seriousness of information silos. To motivate more cultural heritage institutions to participate in platform sharing and promote long-term, stable data sharing behavior, the dynamic evolution process and the law of institutions’ sharing behavior in cultural heritage sharing platforms must be further studied. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model based on evolutionary game theory to explore the evolutionary paths of finite rational cultural heritage institutions to reach a stable strategy, discusses the relevant factors affecting these evolutionary paths, and conducts simulation experiments with the help of MATLAB. This paper finds that the sharing behavior of institutions in cultural heritage sharing platforms is affected by the initial state over time. The free-riding penalty of non-sharing parties, the coefficient of synergistic benefit, the data sharing volume, and the proportion of data complementarity have positive effects on the sharing behavior of cultural heritage institutions; meanwhile, the fixed sharing costs and the loss of gains of sharing parties have an adverse impact on the sharing behavior of cultural heritage institutions. The findings of this paper are essential for solving the cultural heritage sharing dilemma, improving the competitiveness of cultural heritage institutions, and promoting the sustainable development of cultural heritage sharing platforms, which can help promote the development of cultural heritage and help the implementation of cultural digitalization strategies.

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Online User Information Sharing and Government Pandemic Prevention and Control Strategies-Based on Evolutionary Game Model

Cited by 6 publications

References 44 publications

Improving the Communication and Credibility of Government Media in Response to Public Health Emergencies: Analysis of Tweets From the WeChat Official Accounts of 10 Chinese Health Commissioners

Improving the Communication and Credibility of Government Media in Response to Public Health Emergencies: Analysis of Tweets From the WeChat Official Accounts of 10 Chinese Health Commissioners

Regulating the product quality of COVID-19 antigen testing reagents: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis under China's legal framework

Research on Sharing Behavior Strategy of Cultural Heritage Institutions Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

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