2019
DOI: 10.3390/su11247252
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Optimal Decisions and Coordination in a Socially Responsible Supply Chain with Irresponsibility Risk

Abstract: Many companies make some stakeholders pleased but others cannot. To help understand why, it is very important to study the coexistence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate social irresponsibility (CSI). This paper considers a manufacturer with irresponsibility risk in a centralized and decentralized socially responsible supply chain, and uses a Stackelberg game to investigate the optimal policies on price and CSR investment level. This paper also examines the influence of consumer responsibil… Show more

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