Perception, generality, and reasons

Ginsborg, Hannah

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511977206.009

Cited by 42 publications

(20 citation statements)

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“…For defenses of this idea, see Brewer (2011), Logue (this volume), Martin (2009), and Travis (2011. Ginsborg (2011), Logue (2014), McDowell (2009), and Schellenberg (2014 all defend reconciliatory views that are supposed to reconcile representational and relational views of perception. 18 According to McDowell (2006), a subject's reason for believing p is never p, so he thought that a subject's reason for believing p would be that she saw that p. Pritchard (2012) defends a similar view.…”

Section: 1mentioning

confidence: 99%

How and Why Knowledge is First

Littlejohn¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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This chapter’s dialectical aim has, as its focus, a sustained defence of the claim that one cannot have a reason in one’s possession unless it is something that one knows. This view is claimed to have advantages over a different way of thinking about epistemic status. On the ‘reasons-first’ approach to epistemic status, reasons and the possession of them are prior to epistemic status. In reversing this picture, the chapter reveals an important sense in which knowledge comes first—namely, in that we first come to have reasons in our possession by coming to know that certain things are true; there is nothing prior to knowledge that puts these reasons in our possession. In the course of advancing this picture, the chapter furthermore offers a defence of Williamson’s identification of evidence and knowledge (E=K).

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Section: 1mentioning

confidence: 99%

How and Why Knowledge is First

Littlejohn¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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“…I suggest that no good argument has yet been given for the thesis. I focus in particular on Williamson (2000) and Ginsborg (2011) and show that neither provides us with a reason to deny the plausible idea that experience can provide non-inferential justification for belief. I finish by pointing out some theoretical costs and tensions associated with endorsing inferentialism.…”

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confidence: 94%

“…that only something with propositional content can rationally justify a propositional attitude, for only something with propositional content can stand in inferential/logical/rational relations to other propositional contents. As well as Davidson, other prominent advocates of something like this line of thought include: Popper (1959Popper ( [1935), Sellars (1956Sellars ( , 1975, Unger (1975), Rorty (1981), Bonjour (1985), McDowell (1994), Brewer (1999), Williamson (2000), Huemer (2001), Thau (2002), Rosenberg (2002), Lyons (2008), Ginsborg (2011) 4 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Against an inferentialist dogma

Raleigh

2016

Synthese

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I consider the 'inferentialist' thesis that whenever a mental state rationally justifies a belief it is in virtue of inferential relations holding between the contents of the two states. I suggest that no good argument has yet been given for the thesis. I focus in particular on Williamson (2000) and Ginsborg (2011) and show that neither provides us with a reason to deny the plausible idea that experience can provide non-inferential justification for belief. I finish by pointing out some theoretical costs and tensions associated with endorsing inferentialism.

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“…This is so because experience would not reveal things as being in any way and, consequently, it would not provide the required knowledge to judge that things are in some way or other. On this topic, see Ginsborg (2011).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…For this accusation, particularly directed to Travis's version of the relational view, see (McDowell 2009, 267). Ginsborg (2011) argues, against Brewer, that if perception did not have representational content, it could not be a reason for holding judgments and beliefs at all. I believe that Ginsborg's argument could be reworded as an accusation of falling into the Myth of the Given.…”

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confidence: 99%

Non-conceptualism and the Myth of the Given

Kalpokas

2018

Dialectica

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Defenders of non‐conceptualism have been accused of falling into the Myth of the Given. This is John McDowell's main objection to non‐conceptualism. In this article I evaluate some well‐known non‐conceptualist responses to that objection. My analysis shows that non‐conceptualists have not provided plausible explanations for the epistemic role of experience. As a consequence, McDowell's objection seems to be correct. The structure of the article is as follows: first, taking into account the debate between conceptualists and non‐conceptualists, I shed light on what the Myth of the Given is. Second, I critically examine Richard Heck's, Christopher Peacocke's and Robert Hanna's proposals on how experiences justify beliefs. I end the article by clarifying the scope of McDowell's criticism.

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Perception, generality, and reasons

Cited by 42 publications

References 0 publications

How and Why Knowledge is First

How and Why Knowledge is First

Against an inferentialist dogma

Non-conceptualism and the Myth of the Given

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