Perceptual Variation, Color Language, and Reference Fixing. An Objectivist Account

Abstract

I offer a new objectivist theory of the contents of color language and color experience, intended especially as an account of what normal intersubjective variation in color perception and classification shows about those contents. First I explain an abstract account of the contents of (utterances of) color and other gradable adjectives; on the account, these contents are certain objective properties constituted in part by contextually intended standards of application, which are in turn values in the dimensions of variation associated with the adjectives. Then I propose an explanation of normal variations in linguistic color classification; these are postulated to be effects of differences in intended standards for the color adjectives appearing in the classifying predicates. Next, I consider a potential objection to this explanation, based on the suggestion that contextual content should be more accessible than the explanation predicts. In reply, I point out that contextual content is occasionally opaque to unsophisticated reflection. Finally, I present a companion account of the contents of color experiences on which these represent an object as lying on certain salient intervals in the chromatic dimensions, and I show how the account accommodates intersubjective variation in color perception.

A New Argument from Interpersonal Variation to Subjectivism about Color: A Response to Gómez‐Torrente

“…Gómez‐Torrente () offers a novel way for a defender of objectivism about color (which he characterizes as the view that color properties do not essentially involve relations to perceiving subjects) to respond to the argument from interpersonal variation while accepting all of the argument's premises (1–5). He does so by drawing an analogy between color adjectives (“green”, “blue”, etc.)…”

“…In such a situation, when Wy and Zed describe something as “hot”, their intentions fix different standards that something must meet or exceed on the scale of hotness in order to count as hot. (See figures and , which are based on Gómez‐Torrente (, figure )).…”

“…), the content that is thereby fixed can be objective (“x is hot” is true just in case x has a temperature of at least 40 o C, e.g.) (Gómez‐Torrente, , p. 9).…”

“…is supposed to correspond to the hue dimension. Different degrees on the objective dimension can then be ordered into a scale of hues, as in figures and (which are based on Gómez‐Torrente (, figure )).…”

“…A unique green, for example, does not appear to contain any blue or any yellow (see Hardin () for discussion). Gómez‐Torrente (, §1), Cohen (, §3.2), and Cohen (, §2.3.2) (and citations therein) discuss the evidence in support of the claim that there is widespread variation in where the unique hues are located. Allen () questions whether the empirical evidence actually supports the claim that there is such widespread variation.…”