Pleasure in Kant

Morrisson, Iain

doi:10.5840/jpr_2006_1

Journal of Philosophical Research

2006

DOI: 10.5840/jpr_2006_1

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Pleasure in Kant

Iain Morrisson¹

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“… 3 Höwing (2013), Morrisson (2008: 33–4) and McCarty (2009: 16–17) discuss the difference between wishing and Willkür in light of the footnote from the KU . Höwing offers the most detailed exploration of wishing (see note 9 below).…”

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Dutifully Wishing: Kant’s Re-evaluation of a Strange Species of Desire

Englert

2017

Kantian rev.

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For Kant, ‘wish’ is a technical term denoting a strange species of desire. It is an instance in which someone wills something that she simultaneously knows she cannot bring about. As a result, it is, in one sense, antithetical to morality, which deals with ‘ought implies can’. I will argue that Kant re-evaluated wishing as (to some extent) causally efficacious and, further, of moral relevance. This re-evaluation has not been discussed in the literature, yet has been lurking in plain sight in a subtle shift in two versions of a footnote from the Critique of the Power of Judgement.

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Dutifully Wishing: Kant’s Re-evaluation of a Strange Species of Desire

Englert

2017

Kantian rev.

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“…It is this feature of determination that enables practical judgments to function as efficient causes of action. As a bit of shorthand, I will designate the latter as the ‘efficacious’ aspect of determination and the former as the ‘normative’ aspect (Ameriks [2003: 252–53], Henrich [1994: 94-5], and Morrisson [2008: 15–16] describe this distinction in slightly different terms). An agent normatively determines her will by a principle when she takes it to be a normative standard for deliberation, choice, or action.…”

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Kant's Demonstration of Free Will, Or, How to Do Things with Concepts

Yost¹

2016

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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ABSTRACT:Kant famously insists that free will is a condition of morality. The difficulty of providing a demonstration of freedom has left him vulnerable to devastating attack: critics charge that Kant's post-Groundwork justification of morality amounts to a dogmatic assertion of morality's authority. My paper rebuts this objection, showing that Kant offers a cogent demonstration of freedom. My central claim is that the demonstration must be understood in practical rather than theoretical terms. A practical demonstration of x works by bringing x into existence, and what the demonstration of freedom brings into existence is a moral will, a will regulated by the moral law and capable of acting in accordance with it. Since to act morally is to act freely, bringing a moral will into existence actualizes our capacity for freedom and demonstrates that we possess it. To confirm the viability of such a demonstration, Kant must establish that agents can regulate their wills by practical principles, and that practical judgments are efficacious of themselves (i.e., that non-Humean motivational internalism is true). Kant, I argue, is successful on both counts.

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“…He remarks, ‘Certainly one’s disposition to act from the Moral Law is strengthened when it is given public support, and when one can count on others to do so as well.’ For discussion of the roles played by a just political order and external peace in removing obstacles to moral cultivation see Munzel (1999: 175–86, 321–7). For discussion of the ways in which socially acquired passions such as ambition and avarice may threaten even the possibility of moral contemplation see Morrisson (2008: 45–7).…”

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Kantian Moral Striving

Biss

2015

Kantian rev.

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This paper focuses on a single question that highlights some of the most puzzling aspects of Kant’s explanation of the duty of moral self-perfection. What kinds of activity count as striving for purity in one’s disposition to duty, or strength of will? I argue that a dominant strand of Kant’s approach to moral striving does not fit familiar models of striving. I seek to address this problem in a way that avoids the flaws of synchronic and atomistic approaches to moral self-discipline by developing an account of Kantian moral striving as an ongoing contemplative activity complexly engaged with multiple forms of self-knowledge.

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Pleasure in Kant

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

Dutifully Wishing: Kant’s Re-evaluation of a Strange Species of Desire

Dutifully Wishing: Kant’s Re-evaluation of a Strange Species of Desire

Kant's Demonstration of Free Will, Or, How to Do Things with Concepts

Kantian Moral Striving

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