Pluralism in Science: A Call to Action

Chang, Haṡok

doi:10.1007/978-94-007-3932-1_5

Cited by 3 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…The bestowment of unification as the premier approach to science is epitomised by Friedman (1974, p. 15) and Kitcher (1985, p. 638) who proposed that "unification is the essence of scientific explanation" and that it is unification that helps us to attain "the ideal scientific understanding", respectively. However, in more recent years, unified positions have been challenged, and epistemic pluralism has received considerable endorsement as an approach to pursuing scientific research (Cartwright, 1983;Chang, 2012;Dupré, 1993;Giere, 2006;Kellert, Longino & Waters, 2006;Massimi & McCoy, 2020;Mitchell, 2003;Potochnik, 2017;Ruphy, 2016).…”

Section: Epistemic Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recent scholarship upholds that any single approach to understanding phenomena or features of phenomena will necessarily limit our understanding, and fail to meet all the possible epistemic, conceptual, and pragmatic demands that researchers and practitioners may have (Chang, 2012;Kellert, Longino & Waters, 2006;Massimi & McCoy, 2020;Potochnik, 2017Potochnik, , 2020Ruphy, 2016). Rather, epistemic pluralists contend that to maximise the likelihood of productive scientific research, we should structure our research programmes in a way that actively cultivates a plurality of "systems of knowing" (Chang, 2012). This is not to say that unification as a theoretical perspective for conducting scientific research should be abandoned all together and that explanations of phenomena or entities cannot be unified.…”

Section: Epistemic Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One of the key arguments in favour of epistemic pluralism is its ability to provide research programmes that are structured towards specific tasks and provide more nuanced accounts of the various features of complex phenomena. Unified accounts that attempt to capture the complexities of phenomena in a single account are likely to be overly convoluted, rendering them unworkable in any parsimonious or pragmatic way (Chang, 2012;Potochnik, 2017). It is likely that when unified accounts are applied to specific tasks, the information that is relevant to that specific task will be concealed by less relevant detailsspecific details are lost in an attempt to account for every aspect of the phenomena (Chang, 2012).…”

Section: Epistemic Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Unified accounts that attempt to capture the complexities of phenomena in a single account are likely to be overly convoluted, rendering them unworkable in any parsimonious or pragmatic way (Chang, 2012;Potochnik, 2017). It is likely that when unified accounts are applied to specific tasks, the information that is relevant to that specific task will be concealed by less relevant detailsspecific details are lost in an attempt to account for every aspect of the phenomena (Chang, 2012). The epistemic pluralist position, instead, proposes that there is utility in developing various accounts of phenomena, each prioritising different aspects of the phenomena according to different tasks, goals, and research interests (Chang, 2012;Potochnik, 2017;Ruphy, 2016).…”

Section: Epistemic Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is important to note that epistemic pluralism does not advocate for an "anything goes" approach to conducting scientific research, but rather, as Chang (2012) suggests, it provides a research programme where "many things go" (p. 561). The development of a plurality of models, explanations, or in the case of my research, classification systems, requires that the development and adoption of different accounts or strategies are justified and determined to be warranted.…”

Section: Epistemic Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Classificatory Pluralism in Correctional Psychology: Advancing Our Research and Practice

Carter¹

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Scientific classification, although often underemphasised, has a profound impact on subsequent scientific tasks such as explanation, prediction, and in applied fields, treatment. It also shapes the way that we interact with the world, and guides the kinds of decisions that we make, be they empirical or non-empirical. In correctional psychology, it has been acknowledged that classification practices lack validity and are fraught with conceptual weaknesses. However, there has been little scholarship addressing these weaknesses, offering alternative approaches, or critically considering what would be required to improve correctional classification practices. In this doctoral thesis I begin to address this gap in the literature and argue it is time that classification be taken seriously in psychological research. In doing so, I adopt a theoretical perspective known as epistemic pluralism, and from this lens I develop a novel approach to correctional classification and provide two conceptual frameworks that are necessary for this approach to be implemented in practice. The implications of this novel approach are explored, and it is argued that a theoretical shift from a unified to a pluralistic account of classification provides a more appropriate and profitable approach to classifying correctional phenomena, and helps to address the conceptual problems that existing practices display. Continuing to establish research and practice around conceptually impoverished categories is not a scientifically defensible direction for correctional psychology. Rather, it is time that the complexity of correctional psychology is acknowledged and accounted for in our classificatory work. Failing to do so results in poor scientific progress and treatment programmes/modalities that display, at best, modest outcomes. This thesis provides the methodological and conceptual foundations for advancing correctional classification practices, and ultimately, improving correctional research and practice.

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Section: Epistemic Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Epistemic Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Epistemic Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Epistemic Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Epistemic Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Classificatory Pluralism in Correctional Psychology: Advancing Our Research and Practice

Carter¹

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Conceptual scaffolding for the philosophy of medicine

Friedman

2024

Med Health Care and Philos

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This paper consists of two parts. In the first part, I will introduce a philosophical toolbox that I call ‘conceptual scaffolding,’ which helps to reflect holistically on phenomena and concepts. I situate this framework within the landscape of conceptual analysis and conceptual engineering, exemplified by the debate about the concept of disease. Within the framework of conceptual scaffolding, I develop the main idea of the paper, which is ‘the binocular model of plural medicine’, a holistic framework for analyzing medical concepts and phenomena. In the second part, I demonstrate the use and value of the binocular model by analyzing, through the lenses of the model, the phenomenon of health wearable devices and their effects on the concept of diagnosis.

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Psychoneural reduction revised: The case of suicidality in bipolar disorder

Carls‐Diamante,

Atanasova

2024

Eur J of Neuroscience

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This paper uses suicidality in bipolar disorder (BD) to illustrate that multidimensional frameworks account for complex phenomena with cognitive, psychological, socioenvironmental and physiological components better than their reductionist counterparts. We challenge level‐based reductionist models that regard a particular dimension as fundamental. To comprehensively understand complex psychiatric phenomena, multidimensional models that acknowledge the heterogeneity of aetiological factors, rather than homogenising them under a single dimension, must be utilised. Multidimensional models allow a better understanding of the individual context under which a psychiatric phenomenon arises, and the interrelationships between its different aetiological dimensions.Suicidality in BD is used as a case study because it particularly highlights the interplay between biological, psychological, sociocultural and experiential factors. The multidimensional nature of suicidality is reflected by the heterogeneous strategies by which it is managed. Although similar to suicidality in other contexts, in BD suicidality has distinctive structural characteristics that emphasise its multidimensionality. Consequently, investigating suicidality in BD yields claims generalisable to suicidality as a whole alongside novel insights on BD‐specific features. For instance, suicidality in BD has physiological causal factors, e.g., genetic predisposition and aggravation by symptomatic periods. However, its other features underscore the causal roles of cognitions. In persons with BD, suicidality can persist beyond depression and is sometimes experienced during mania, possibly due to suicidal ideation persisting beyond symptomatic periods. This indicates the need to account for cognitive or psychological causal factors.Models of suicidality in BD typically adopt a non‐level‐based, non‐reductionist approach, reflected in the diverse clinical strategies for managing suicidality in BD.

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Pluralism in Science: A Call to Action

Cited by 3 publications

References 37 publications

Classificatory Pluralism in Correctional Psychology: Advancing Our Research and Practice

Classificatory Pluralism in Correctional Psychology: Advancing Our Research and Practice

Conceptual scaffolding for the philosophy of medicine

Psychoneural reduction revised: The case of suicidality in bipolar disorder

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