Pmh28 Assessing the Life-Cycle Value Added of Second-Generation Antipsychotics in Sweden and the Uk: The Case of Risperidone

Berdud, Mikel; Bernhardsson, N. Wallin; Talaya, M.B. Zamora; Lindgren, Peter; Towse, Adrian

doi:10.1016/j.jval.2019.09.1502

Cited by 1 publication

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“…Our focus is “in-patent” price competition for patented medicines from new alternative medical therapies occurring in many diseases or conditions (Berndt et al ( 13 ); Kanavos et al ( 14 ); Danzon and Chao, ( 15 )). Examples include direct-acting antiviral treatments for hepatitis C (Roediger et al ( 16 ); Berdud et al ( 17 )), second-generation antipsychotics ( 18 ), and oncologic medicines (Vokinger et al, ( 19 )).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Market competition affects the distribution of bargaining power. Our focus is "in-patent" price competition for patented medicines from new alternative medical therapies occurring in many diseases or conditions (Berndt et 17)), second-generation antipsychotics (18), and oncologic medicines (Vokinger et al, (19)).…”

Section: Using Competition In Markets For Patented Pharmaceuticalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is the case in pharmaceutical markets where the payers' impatience is defined by the clinical need and developers' impatience is defined by the sunk nature of R&D cost. The Nash bargaining solution has been applied to model pharmaceutical markets in different settings (16)(17)(18)(19).…”

Section: Data Availability Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A theory on ICER pricing and optimal levels of cost-effectiveness thresholds: a bargaining approach

Berdud,

Ferraro,

Towse

2023

Front. Health Serv.

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In many health systems around the world, decisions about the reimbursement of—and patient access to—new medicines are based on health technology assessments (HTA) which, in some countries, include the calculation of an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER). Decision-makers compare the ICER against a pre-specified value for money criterion, known as the cost-effectiveness threshold (CET), to decide in favour of or against reimbursement. We developed a general model of pharmaceutical markets to analyse the relationship between the CET value and the distribution of the health and economic value of new medicines between consumers (payers) and producers (life science industry developers). We added to the existing literature in three ways: including research and development (R&D) cost for developers as a sunk cost; incorporating bargaining using the Nash bargaining solution to model payer bargaining power from regulation and use of competition; and analysing the impact of a non-uniform distribution of developers R&D costs on the supply of innovation. In some circumstances of bargaining power distribution and R&D cost, we found that using a CET value in HTA decision-making higher than the supply-side CET is socially efficient. Decision-makers should consider adjustable levels of the CET or interpretation of ICERs higher than the CET according to the bargaining power effect. The findings of this research pointed to the need for more research on the impact of bargaining power, how R&D investment responds to rewards, i.e. the elasticity of innovation, and pre- and post-patent expiry modelling.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Using Competition In Markets For Patented Pharmaceuticalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A theory on ICER pricing and optimal levels of cost-effectiveness thresholds: a bargaining approach

Berdud,

Ferraro,

Towse

2023

Front. Health Serv.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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Pmh28 Assessing the Life-Cycle Value Added of Second-Generation Antipsychotics in Sweden and the Uk: The Case of Risperidone

Cited by 1 publication

References 0 publications

A theory on ICER pricing and optimal levels of cost-effectiveness thresholds: a bargaining approach

A theory on ICER pricing and optimal levels of cost-effectiveness thresholds: a bargaining approach

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