Point Score Systems and Competitive Imbalance in Professional Soccer

Haugen, Kjetil K.

doi:10.1177/1527002507301116

Cited by 30 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Of direct relevance for this article (and football) is perhaps [8,9] as well as [5,7] and [12]. Other branches of sports activity and the role of the point score system has also been investigated -see for instance [3].…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…inequalities (5.1)), there is a greater tendency for secrecy under the 3-1-0 than the 2-1-0 system. As the 3-1-0 system has previously been identified as having negative consequences related to the competitive balance (see [9]), some more questions related to this system's qualities should be asked. Personally, I am in no doubt, reintroduce the original 2-1-0 system.…”

Section: Conclusion and Suggestions For Further Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1) The modelling framework of [9] (also applied in [8,10,11]) is adapted: 2) The teams behave rationally, and are assumed to maximise the expected point scores;…”

Section: Basic Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 introduces the game framework and makes some necessary reformulations of the basic underlying framework, captured from [9]. The main analysis is performed in Sections 4 and 5, while Section 6 concludes and points out some additional research directions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Point score systems and football coaching secrecy

Haugen¹

2016

Math. Appl.

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Abstract. In this paper, a game between two football (soccer) teams is analysed. The focus is on how the choice of point score system may affect Nash equilibria in a given simultaneous game and a corresponding sequential version. The reason for this choice, is (to some extent) experience related to the growing secrecy on pre-game strategic choices among football coaches.It is demonstrated by the relatively simple game theory, that the point score system plays a vital role in how teams (coaches) will "play" such games, given that they are rational and recognize Nash equilibrium as a reasonable game prediction. In fact, some evidence on an increased tendency for more pre-game strategic secrecy is logically established in a move from a 2-1-0 point score system to a 3-1-0 point score system.

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Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Conclusion and Suggestions For Further Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1) The modelling framework of [9] (also applied in [8,10,11]) is adapted: 2) The teams behave rationally, and are assumed to maximise the expected point scores;…”

Section: Basic Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Point score systems and football coaching secrecy

Haugen¹

2016

Math. Appl.

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“…Guedes and Machado (2002) estimate the effectiveness of increasing the value of a win from two to three competition points as a means of inducing more attacking play, using data before and after the rule change. Meanwhile, Haugen (2008) notes the implications of the rule on competitive balance of leagues.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Policy Timing and Footballers' Incentives

Lenten

Libich

Stehlı́k

2012

Journal of Sports Economics

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Assessing the effect of the timing and sequencing of various policy regimes on optimizing agent behavior is both important and difficult. To offer some insights, this article examines a timing decision from sports. The penalty shootout in football (soccer) has long been seen as problematic, among other reasons because it creates incentives for excessively cautious play during extra time. One proposal to alleviate this has been to alter the timing, and stage the shootout before (rather than after) extra time with the result binding only if the subsequent extra time offers no resolution. Carrillo's (2007) theoretical model shows that since the effect of this rule change is ambiguous in theory, the proposal's desirability needs to be assessed empirically. Using a comprehensive match data set, the authors compare scoring outcomes of various treatment and control groups, whereby the former simulate closely players' incentives from the proposed rule change, and the latter represent the current timing. Most importantly, the authors examine how extra time scoring probabilities depend on a goal being scored in the first 5 (or 15) min of extra time. Their estimates suggest that bringing the shootout before extra time would substantially alter the players' incentives in extra time and produce more overall attacking play. Quantitatively, the rule change is predicted to increase the odds of extra time scoring about threefold. Specifically, for the FIFA World Cup and the UEFA club competitions, the probability of scoring in extra time is estimated to increase on average by 45-60%, depending on various factors such as the result in regulation time, balancedness of the teams, and home ground advantage. In summary, all these results suggest that the case for trialing the proposed rule is strong. More generally, they highlight the incentive channels through which sequencing of policies may determine their effectiveness.

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Points Scoring Systems in Formula 1: A Game Theoretic Perspective

Bakhrankova

2012

Operations Research Proceedings

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Point Score Systems and Competitive Imbalance in Professional Soccer

Cited by 30 publications

References 12 publications

Point score systems and football coaching secrecy

Point score systems and football coaching secrecy

Policy Timing and Footballers' Incentives

Points Scoring Systems in Formula 1: A Game Theoretic Perspective

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