An emerging stream of literature investigates the impact of political uncertainty on financial markets. In this survey, we review this line of literature from four perspectives, namely, asset prices, corporate policies, financial intermediaries, and economy and households, suggesting that political uncertainty generally increases market friction and as a result changes corporate behavior and adversely affects the economy. At the end of the survey, we discuss a few future directions worth being explored in view of the relationship between political uncertainty and finance. most likely to occur if the old policy has led to unexpected low realized profitability. Therefore, policy change can increase firms' expected profitability, thereby pushing stock prices up, that is, the cash flow effect. However, due to the new policy's higher uncertainty, policy change can also increase discount rates, thereby pushing stock prices down, that is, the discount rate effect. The authors show analytically that, on average, the discount rate effect will outweigh the cash flow effect and stock prices will fall at the announcement of a government policy change. The reason is that positive announcement returns tend to be small as policy changes that have the potential to push stock prices up are mostly expected by investors. Moreover, as new policies introduce more uncertainty and raise the volatility of the stochastic discount factor, government policy changes will increase stock return volatilities and correlations.Closely related to P astor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) analyze the risk premium induced by political uncertainty. P astor and Veronesi (2013) extend the general equilibrium model developed by P astor and Veronesi (2012) in two key aspects. First, unlike P astor and Veronesi (2012) who assume political cost is unknown to investors, P astor and Veronesi (2013) allow investors to learn about the political costs of the new policies through the stream of political news. Second, P astor and Veronesi (2012) assume that all government policies are identical a priori, whereas P astor and Veronesi (2013) allow the government to choose from a set of heterogeneous policies. The impacts of both, the learning about political costs and policy heterogeneity, are larger in weak economic conditions when a policy change is more likely to happen.Accordingly, in P astor and Veronesi's (2013) analytic model, stock returns are driven by capital shocks, impact shocks, and political shocks, and correspondingly the equity risk premium can be decomposed into three components based on the three types of shocks. As the optimal choice for the government is to change its policy when the old policy is perceived as sufficiently unfavorable, the authors show analytically that the composition of the risk premium varies depending on the economic state. In weak economic conditions when the probability of a policy change is high, the equity risk premium is largely driven by the political risk premium. However, in strong economic conditions when a policy change ...