Power and electromagnetic analysis: Improved model, consequences and comparisons

Peeters, Eric; Standaert, François‐Xavier; Quisquater, Jean-Jacques

doi:10.1016/j.vlsi.2005.12.013

Cited by 151 publications

(90 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Several works have demonstrated the validity of HW and HD models in practice, which are today commonly accepted by the SCA community. However other more precise models exist in the literature (see for instance [3,9,16]). …”

Section: Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conversion of Security Proofs from One Leakage Model to Another: A New Issue

Coron

Giraud

Prouff

et al. 2012

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. To guarantee the security of a cryptographic implementation against Side Channel Attacks, a common approach is to formally prove the security of the corresponding scheme in a model as pertinent as possible. Nowadays, security proofs for masking schemes in the literature are usually conducted for models where only the manipulated data are assumed to leak. However in practice, the leakage is better modeled encompassing the memory transitions as e.g. the Hamming distance model. From this observation, a natural question is to decide at which extent a countermeasure proved to be secure in the first model stays secure in the second. In this paper, we look at this issue and we show that it must definitely be taken into account. Indeed, we show that a countermeasure proved to be secure against second-order side-channel attacks in the first model becomes vulnerable against a first-order side-channel attack in the second model. Our result emphasize the issue of porting an implementation from devices leaking only on the manipulated data to devices leaking on the memory transitions.

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Section: Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conversion of Security Proofs from One Leakage Model to Another: A New Issue

Coron

Giraud

Prouff

et al. 2012

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…The designed EM probe is a self-made multi-turn coil antenna [20]. The design parameters are: copper wire diameter: 0.4mm; antenna diameter: 4mm; antenna turns: 25.…”

Section: Setup Of Em Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

SCA security verification on wireless sensor network node

Wilson

Torre

et al. 2011

VLSI Circuits and Systems V

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Side Channel Attack (SCA) differs from traditional mathematic attacks. It gets around of the exhaustive mathematic calculation and precisely pin to certain points in the cryptographic algorithm to reveal confidential information from the running crypto-devices. Since the introduction of SCA by Paul Kocher et al [1], it has been considered to be one of the most critical threats to the resource restricted but security demanding applications, such as wireless sensor networks. In this paper, we focus our work on the SCA-concerned security verification on WSN (wireless sensor network). A detailed setup of the platform and an analysis of the results of DPA (power attack) and EMA (electromagnetic attack) is presented. The setup follows the way of low-cost setup to make effective SCAs. Meanwhile, surveying the weaknesses of WSNs in resisting SCA attacks, especially for the EM attack. Finally, SCA-Prevention suggestions based on Differential Security Strategy for the FPGA hardware implementation in WSN will be given, helping to get an improved compromise between security and cost.

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“…The analysis of EM emissions has proven an effective side channel able to yield efficient attacks [1,4,12], although it implies a quadratic increase in the number of chip spots to be considered when compared to a DPA technique. A significant factor for this efficiency is the use of small probes with a consequent precise spatial localization of the sources of the measured signal.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Leakage Discovery Techniques to Enhance Secure Chip Design

Barenghi

Pelosi

Téglia

2011

Information Security Theory and Practice. Security and Privacy of Mobile Devices in Wireless Communication

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Abstract. Side channel attacks analyzing both power consumption and electromagnetic (EM) radiations are a well known threat to the security of devices dealing with sensitive data. Whilst it is well known that the EM emissions of a chip represent an information leakage stronger than the overall dynamic power consumption, the actual relation between the emissions and the computations is still a subject under exploration. It is important for the chip designer to be able to distinguish which portions of the measured EM emissions are actually correlated with the sensitive information. Our technique obtains a detailed profile of the information leakage, identifying which harmonic components carry the largest part of the it on the measured signals. It may be successfully integrated in a design workflow as a post-testing feedback from the prototype chip, in the form of additional constraints aimed at reducing the local wires congestion up to a point where the emissions are no longer sufficient to conduct an attack. The analysis allows the design of ad-hoc countermeasures (shields and/or EM jammers), which do not require architectural changes to the chip. We provide a validation of the proposed technique on a commercial grade ARM Cortex-M3 based System on Chip (SoC), executing a software implementation of AES-128. The proposed approach is more efficient than a search of the whole frequency spectrum, allowing to conduct a deeper analysis with the same timing constraints.

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Power and electromagnetic analysis: Improved model, consequences and comparisons

Cited by 151 publications

References 17 publications

Conversion of Security Proofs from One Leakage Model to Another: A New Issue

Conversion of Security Proofs from One Leakage Model to Another: A New Issue

SCA security verification on wireless sensor network node

Information Leakage Discovery Techniques to Enhance Secure Chip Design

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