Power Grabs from the Top: A Database of Self-Coups

Abstract

This research note introduces new global data on self-coups—rapid moves by sitting executive leaders to “overthrow” their own governments and illegitimately maintain or extend power. Self-coups are distinct from ordinary coups (sudden illegal attempts by other elites to topple the sitting executive) and overlap with incumbent takeovers (incremental quasi-legal steps by the sitting executive to amass power). Still, there is conceptual discord about what delineates self-coups and a resultant lack of consensus about basic facts, even about where and when self-coups have happened. To provide a firmer foundation for investigating the self-coup phenomenon systematically, I draw from eight datasets and original data collection and coding to present comprehensive data on 147 individual events (plus 90 candidate incidents that did not fully meet the criteria) in the 1950–2022 period. The dataset provides information on the perpetrators, targets, flashpoint dates, and methods of these events. Illustrative statistical analysis suggests that following a self-coup, the level of international economic aid tends to have a negative effect on the probability that a country will hold competitive elections. Future research may apply these data for a better understanding of the causes of self-coups and the long-term effects of self-coups on political and economic development.