Power theories for multi-choice organizations and political rules: Rank-order equivalence

Pongou, Roland; Tchantcho, Bertrand; Tedjeugang, Narcisse

doi:10.1016/j.orp.2014.06.002

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 37 publications

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“…Parker (2012) generalizes this result to the whole class of linear voting rules with abstention. Pongou et al (2014) obtain this result as a special case of a more general result in the class of multi-choice rules. This result is summarized below: Lemma 2.…”

Section: Definitionmentioning

confidence: 68%

Round-robin political tournaments: Abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power

Pongou

Tchantcho

2021

Games and Economic Behavior

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A round-robin political tournament is an election format where multiple candidates contest in pairs, and votes are aggregated using a general rule to form a social ranking. We formalize this tournament as a strategic form game and provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which truthful voting is a Nash equilibrium. Building on this analysis, we study the concept of effective power, defined as a voter's ability to bring about a social ranking that maximizes his preferences. We show that the classical theories of political power do not translate into effective power in general. We then provide a full characterization of the classes of political tournaments and utility metrics for which these theories capture effective power. We offer both structural and behavioral interpretations of the findings, and derive practical implications for the design of political tournaments that are compatible with truth-telling.

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Section: Definitionmentioning

confidence: 68%

Round-robin political tournaments: Abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power

Pongou

Tchantcho

2021

Games and Economic Behavior

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A critical analysis on the notion of power

Freixas

Pons

2021

Ann Oper Res

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In this paper we discuss on several ways to extend power indices, regarded as measures of power as a payment (P-power), in the context of simple games with three or more ordered levels of input approval. Two groups of power indices for simple games are deduced from the selection of 1) a bargaining model, and 2) a set of coalitions that count to measure power. The combination of two well-known bargaining models and three subsets of winning coalitions lead to six well-known power indices for simple games as a payoff. The main purpose of the paper is to generalize this scheme to the broader context considered.We show that several notions of criticality arise when considering three or more levels of approval and we propose some natural ways to count criticality when it comes to measuring power as a payment. We highlight two of them, first-order criticality and total criticality. Thus, we establish some reasonable power indices by selecting 1) a bargaining model, 2) a set of coalitions, and 3) a way to measure criticality. In particular, we show two reasonable ways to extend well-known power indices, such as the Banzhaf, Johnston, Deegan and Packel, or Holler from simple games to games with several ordered levels of approval in the input.

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