Power, trust, and network complexity: three logics of hedging in Asian security

Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages

“…18 The principle indicators of hedging include military strengthening without a declared adversary, increased participation in bilateral and multilateral cooperation, the absence of firm balancing or bandwagoning and the simultaneous improvement in relations with the two greatest regional powers. 19 In the same vein, Medeiros defines hedging as "pursuing policies that on the one hand stress engagement and integration mechanisms and, on the other, emphasize realist-style balancing in the form of external security cooperation."…”

“…In the face of strategic uncertainty, states often hedge, which was defined earlier as a strategy of pursuing opposing or contradictory actions as a means of minimizing or mitigating downside risks associated with alignment behavior. 28 The goal of hedging is to secure as many benefits as possible from as many states as possible. The principle indicators of hedging include military strengthening without a declared adversary, increased participation in bilateral and multilateral cooperation, the absence of firm balancing or bandwagoning, and the simultaneous improvement in relations with the two greatest regional powers.…”

Adoption, accommodation or opposition? - regional powers respond to American-led Indo-Pacific strategy

“…As John Ikenberry (2016, p. 17) writes 'Countries in East Asia that ponder the credibility of America's security commitments will also weigh any uncertainties against their assessment of the dangers that might follow from being left alone in the region with a rising China'. Indeed, there is a rich literature on this topic, though here is not the place to do it justice (Jackson, 2014;Medeiros, 2005). Instead, we can simply draw attention to further equivocations in their polices, such as India's dual membership of the Quad and SCO, for example, or Korea's US alliance contrasting with its membership of AIIB and tacit support for BRI.…”

Waiting for Hard Balancing?

“…57 Hedging policy can also be seen in military without a declared adversary and increasing participation in loose bilateral and multilateral cooperation. 58 Thus in policy practice, indirect balancing and hedging can hardly be distinguished. However, in theoretical terms, indirect balancing and hedging may be different especially in regard to the scope of the behaviour as well as the objective.…”