Power use, cooperative behavior and alliance performance: evidence from contract farming supply chains in China

Abstract

PurposeThis study aims to explore the relationship among five types of power (expert, referent, legitimate, reward and coercive power), two dimensions of cooperative behavior (specific investments and communication) and three types of alliance performance (alliance stability, income increase and cost decrease) in contract farming. By investigating the dyadic perspectives of companies and contract farmers, the authors examine how power use influences cooperative behavior, which further enhances alliance performance.Design/methodology/approachThe authors construct a theoretical model grounded on resource dependence theory (RDT). Data from 202 companies and 462 farmers in China are used to test the proposed hypotheses using structural equation modeling.FindingsThe authors' results show that the five types of power play different roles in cooperative behavior. On the one hand, farmers' expert, reward and coercive power enhance the company's specific investments; farmers' expert power enhances the company's communication but farmers' coercive power harms the company's communication. Also the company's specific investments enhance communication that is positively related to alliance ability, income increase and cost decrease. On the other hand, the company's expert, referent and legitimate power enhance farmers' communication, while the company's coercive power harms farmers' communication; the company's reward and coercive power enhance farmers' specific investments. Moreover, farmers' communication is positively related to alliance ability, income increase and cost decrease, but farmers' specific investments do not significantly influence such.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the literature on contract farming supply chain management by examining the relationships among power use, cooperative behavior and alliance performance from the dyadic perspective of companies and farmers. These findings have practical implications for agricultural companies and farmers promoting cooperative behavior and alliance performance through appropriate power use in contract farming supply chains.

An industry 4.0 adoption in the circular economy application hierarchical model: driver, enable and barrier aspects

“…Yet, resources become the main hurdle to achieving this as smallholders have limited economic resource – financial, incentive; technologies resource – blockchain, collaborative robotics; social resource – knowledge/understanding, collaboration; and environmental resource – operational efficiency, energy recovery. RDT argues that firms/industries are rarely self-sufficient, especially on important strategic resources where integration becomes crucial (Drees, 2013; Fu et al ., 2023; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). The current study offers several theoretical contributions as applied to I4.0–CE application adoption.…”

“…RDT explains how firms should treasure resources to ensure prosperity (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). The main assumption related to the I4.0-CE application is that most firms seldom become self-sufficient, especially on important strategic resources (Fu et al, 2023). Thus, integration (horizontal and/or vertical) becomes crucial as firms depend on each other to adopt I4.0-CE applications.…”

The role of relationship commitment in managing logistics outsourcing in the digital economy

“…Various information-sharing platforms in the digital economy have provided adequate opportunities for communication between 3PL users and their providers (Shukla et al, 2023). When communication is at a high level, information transparency is significantly increased (Fu et al, 2023) so that 3PL users can promptly perceive and further restrain the opportunistic behavior of 3PL providers. In addition, adequate communication can facilitate alliances (Fu et al, 2023).…”

“…When communication is at a high level, information transparency is significantly increased (Fu et al, 2023) so that 3PL users can promptly perceive and further restrain the opportunistic behavior of 3PL providers. In addition, adequate communication can facilitate alliances (Fu et al, 2023). When 3PL users are highly dependent on 3PL providers, the close alliances between them make the 3PL providers more reluctant to behave opportunistically.…”