Accoutiung accreEiis are managers' sisbjective estimates of future outcomes and cannot, by definition, be objectively verified by auditors prior to occurrence. This causes audits of high-accraai firms to pose more uncertainty than audits of low-accrual firms because of poiemiai estimation eiTor and a greater chance that high-accrual firms have undetected asset realization and/or going concern problems that are related to the high level of iiccruaJs. One way that .auditors can compensate for this risk exposure is to lower their threshold for issuing modified audit reports, an action that will increase modified reports and, therefore, lessen the likeJihocd of failing to issue a modified report when appropriate. We caFi tliis auditor reporting coiisen,-atism and test if high-accrual firms in the United States, are more likely to receive modified audit reports for asset realization uncertainties and going concern probSems. Empirical results for a large sample of U.S. publicly listed companies support the hypothesis that auditors are more conservative, that is, more likely io isma both types, of modified audit reports for high-accrual firms. Further analyses show that iiscoae-increasing accruals are .somewhat more likely to result in reporting co.nsen'atism than income-decreasing accruals, and that oniy the Big Six group of auditors show evidence of reporting consei-vatism. These findings add to our understanding of the audit fsport formation process and tjse potentiaily important role played by accounting accruals ia that process.
CondenseLe procleme empirique etudie par les auteurs est le suivant: les produits et les charges i.on.staf,es par regularisation dans une societe augmentent-ils la probabilite que le rapport Se vsrificarioi! soit assorti de restriciions (modifi6) en raison soit 1) d'incertitudes •; mpojiantes. principalement Jiees a )a realisation d'actifs, soit 2) de problemes plus graves de continuite de i'exploitation. Les produits et les charges constatfe par regularisation sont des estimations stibjectives des cadres en ce qui a trait aux resultats futurs et ne peuvent, pai dcfiniiion, etre objectivement verifies par les verificateurs avant Ieur occurrence, ce qui * Accepted by Dan Simunic. We appreciate the helpful comments of the editor (Dan Simunic) and two anonymous referees, and the comments received on earlier versions of the paper when presented at