Preference heterogeneity in experiments: Comparing the field and laboratory

Andersen, Steffen; Harrison, Glenn W.; Lau, Morten I.; Rutström, E. Elisabet

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.09.006

Cited by 123 publications

(66 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…Without the presence of information, the value of r lies between 0.3977 and 0.4861, however, the addition of information in the choice set reduced the r values to a range between 0.1281 and 0.2018. The results for the risk attitudes without information are consistent with earlier studies Andersen et al, 2010). The presence of order effects were investigated by evaluating statistical differences between the coefficients using a conventional "Z-test" (Paternoster et al, 1998).…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 83%

Impact of information on risk attitudes: Implications on valuation of reliability and information

Wijayaratna

Dixit

2016

Journal of Choice Modelling

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 83%

Impact of information on risk attitudes: Implications on valuation of reliability and information

Wijayaratna

Dixit

2016

Journal of Choice Modelling

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“…By means of non-laboratory experiments, we expected to attain higher heterogeneity among individuals' discount rates [30]. We indeed found important differences in DD among participants (see the electronic supplementary material, figure S4).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 62%

Patient and impatient punishers of free-riders

et al. 2012

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Costly punishment of cheaters who contribute little or nothing to a cooperating group has been extensively studied, as an effective means to enforce cooperation. The prevailing view is that individuals use punishment to retaliate against transgressions of moral standards such as fairness or equity. However, there is much debate regarding the psychological underpinnings of costly punishment. Some authors suggest that costly punishment must be a product of humans' capacity for reasoning, self-control and long-term planning, whereas others argue that it is the result of an impulsive, present-oriented emotional drive. Here, we explore the inter-temporal preferences of punishers in a multilateral cooperation game and show that both interpretations might be right, as we can identify two different types of punishment: punishment of free-riders by cooperators, which is predicted by patience (future orientation); and free-riders' punishment of other free-riders, which is predicted by impatience (present orientation). Therefore, the picture is more complex as punishment by free-riders probably comes not from a reaction against a moral transgression, but instead from a competitive, spiteful drive. Thus, punishment grounded on morals may be related to lasting or delayed psychological incentives, whereas punishment triggered by competitive desires may be linked to short-run aspirations. These results indicate that the individual's time horizon is relevant for the type of social behaviour she opts for. Integrating such differences in inter-temporal preferences and the social behaviour of agents might help to achieve a better understanding of how human cooperation and punishment behaviour has evolved.

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“…elicit individual risk attitudes and combine hypothetical surveys with experiments that involve monetary incentives. A total of 450 subjects participated in their experiment, and they were recruited from 179 randomly chosen voting districts in Germany Andersen et al (2010). examine the strengths and weaknesses of laboratory and field experiments to detect differences in preferences over risk and time that are associated with standard, observable characteristics of the individual.4 This study was primarily concerned with the relationship between body mass index and measures of impulsive behavior, and the subjects were therefore asked to fast 12 h before they arrived to the laboratory and participated in the experiment.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%