Preferential trade agreements and antidumping protection

Tabakis, Chrysostomos; Zanardi, Maurizio

doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2019.07.001

Cited by 18 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…By contrast, Bown and Tovar () provide empirical evidence that MERCOSUR's preferential liberalisation process has led to increased extra‐bloc import protection including AD in the case of Argentina and Brazil. In a similar vein, Tabakis and Zanardi () investigate the effects of the negotiation and implementation of PTAs on the use of AD by member countries against non‐members but generally find a negative relation in this respect.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 95%

False friends? Empirical evidence on trade policy substitution in regional trade agreements

Silberberger

Stender

2018

World Economy

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In this paper, we examine the interplay of regional economic integration and the use of bilateral antidumping (AD) measures. Our empirical analysis brings three central findings to light: (i) we find that regional trade agreements (RTAs) generally reduce the likelihood of AD activity among integration partners; (ii) in addition, an improvement in the tariff treatment between trading partners—regardless of whether expressed as the directly faced tariff or as a tariff margin—generally leads to a lower likelihood of bilateral AD and (iii) regarding the interaction of both events, however, a reciprocally higher tariff margin between integration partners leads to a higher likelihood of bilateral AD than an equal tariff margin among non‐integration trading partners. The latter effect seems to be primarily driven by those RTAs with a participation of “South” countries.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 95%

False friends? Empirical evidence on trade policy substitution in regional trade agreements

Silberberger

Stender

2018

World Economy

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“…One of the reasons is that MFN tariffs are relatively low. Recently, Tabakis and Zanardi (2019) attempted to determine whether preferential trade agreements are building blocks or stumbling blocks towards multilateral trade liberalisation. Based on the empirical analysis of 15 most intense users of antidumping, the authors found the building bloc effect of the preferential trade agreements because they result in fewer antidumping measures against non-member countries.…”

Section: Trade Creation and Diversion Effectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is NAFTA Trade‐Creating or Trade‐Diverting? A System GMM Approach

Heo

Doanh

2020

J of App Econs and Policy

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This paper estimates the trade creation and trade diversion effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) using a panel data set of 77 countries for the period 1989–2016. We found that the formation of NAFTA has resulted in both import trade creation and diversion. However, the magnitude of trade creation is higher than that of trade diversion. On the sectoral level, trade creation and diversion occur in both agricultural and non‐agricultural imports, with trade creation exhibiting a higher magnitude. The magnitude of trade creation and diversion is found to be the highest for agricultural imports, which are followed by total and non‐agricultural imports, respectively.

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“…This study is one of only a small number of papers that analyze the effect of PTAs on TTBs. Blonigen (2005), Prusa and Teh (2010), and Tabakis and Zanardi (2019) focus on antidumping. The first considers how NAFTA impacts the use of antidumping by the US.…”

Section: World Trade Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political–Economic Determinants of External Import Protection under a Preferential Trade Agreement

Tovar

2021

World Trade Review

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The stalling of WTO multilateralism and the proliferation of preferential trade agreements in recent decades have drawn substantial attention to the impacts of preferential liberalization. A critical question is how they affect the trade barriers imposed against outsiders. I examine the relationship between preferential trade liberalization and protection against non-member countries by testing the predictions of a political–economy model based on the previous literature. Focusing on a specific model allows me to uncover the mechanisms via which preferential liberalization affects external import protection, whereas most of the existing literature has focused on establishing the sign of the effect only. Furthermore, I focus on not only tariffs, as most studies do, but also on the temporary trade barriers of antidumping and safeguards. I test the predictions for Latin America and obtain results that provide solid evidence supporting two mechanisms from the theory, which lead to lower protection against non-members of a preferential trade agreement. First, a lower preferential import protection level means that the increase in preferential imports from increasing the external tariff creates a smaller increase in tariff revenue. Second, as preferential import protection is cut, there is a decrease in the markup and sales of domestic firms, and thus raising the external import protection generates less profit. Moreover, this second effect is present when the political motivation of the government is sufficiently strong.

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Preferential trade agreements and antidumping protection

Cited by 18 publications

References 42 publications

False friends? Empirical evidence on trade policy substitution in regional trade agreements

False friends? Empirical evidence on trade policy substitution in regional trade agreements

Is NAFTA Trade‐Creating or Trade‐Diverting? A System GMM Approach

Political–Economic Determinants of External Import Protection under a Preferential Trade Agreement

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