Preparing the design of robust climate policy architectures

Verbruggen, Aviel

doi:10.1007/s10784-010-9130-x

Cited by 11 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…This means the strong form subsumes the weak form plus the principle of equity. Verbruggen [21] talks of the OECD light version and extended version of PPP, where the former requires polluters to pay only their own abatement expenses in meeting environmental policy obligations, and extended version adds commitment to compensate for damages inflicted occasioned to public good. Some scholars bring in the conceptions of negative and positive duties [22][23][24].…”

Section: Origin Nature and Rationale Of The Pppmentioning

confidence: 99%

Polluter-Pays-Principle: The Cardinal Instrument for Addressing Climate Change

Khan

2015

Laws

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This article traces the evolution of polluter-pays-principle (PPP) as an economic, ethical and legal instrument and argues that it has the potential of effecting global responsibility for adaptation and mitigation and for generating reliable funding for the purpose. However, the contradiction is that while it rests on neoliberal market principles, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change did not include the PPP as its provision though the principle of "common but differentiated responsibility based on respective capabilities" (Article 3.1) implicitly recognizes this. The article raises the basic question that under a free-market global system: why should the polluters not take responsibility of their actions so that the global society does not suffer? The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries apply this PPP in many of its forms. Some developing countries are also applying it albeit still more as a governmental rather than polluter responsibility. Currently there is an emerging consensus that a carbon tax should be applied globally to address the intractable problem of climate change. Since the problem relates to a global commons, the issue is how to apply the PPP globally yet equitably. This article brings in Caney's proposal that as complementary to the PPP. The "ability to pay principle" (APP) can take care of emissions of the past agreed by the Parties and current and future legitimate emissions of the disadvantaged countries and groups of people. He calls the latter poverty-sensitive PPP. While PPP is primarily a market principle, APP is a principle of justice and equity. That polluters should pay the social and environmental costs of their pollution reflects the most fundamental principles of justice and responsibility.

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Section: Origin Nature and Rationale Of The Pppmentioning

confidence: 99%

Polluter-Pays-Principle: The Cardinal Instrument for Addressing Climate Change

Khan

2015

Laws

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“…Yet, the steps from willing to doing seem difficult to take. In exploring ways forward, some conditions are salient, but the five highlighted here are only a small selection from many considerations discussed in the literature [4,17].…”

Section: Urgent Combat and Deep Cuts Impose Conditions On Policy Designsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The Copenhagen Accord opens that road by sidelining the top-down directed instruments. Effectiveness, efficiency and equity criteria are not respected by imposing uniform rules on a tremendously diverse reality [4]. On the contrary: matching a uniform fiction with diverse realities necessitates never-ending ad hoc adjustments, mostly through obscure "comitology" processes [23,24].…”

Section: Urgent Combat and Deep Cuts Impose Conditions On Policy Designsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Here I provide only a principled answer on the political feasibility question: the proposals here are possible, desirable, and necessary. The proposals are possible because they address the essential characteristics of climate change and the related common-pool resource issues [4,21] using existing operational institutes, instruments and practices. Nothing has to be invented or founded anew.…”

Section: A Light and Realistic Global Climate Policy Architecturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several new institutions have been created without expedient audits of operational institutions embedded in institutes with trained and experienced staff, knowledge and know-how, data and memory, etc. Even having economic giants available, uniform scything has little effect, and is inefficient and unfair because emissions are resulting from "trillions of decisions made by billions of people" [3], representing the high diversity and complexity of human communities on earth [4]. Instruments creating the necessary additional climate pricing pressures must take into account the pressures already in place and the different areas the forces are working on, considering also unequal carrying capacity of people [5,6].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Turbo Drive for the Global Reduction of Energy-Related CO2 Emissions

Verbruggen

2011

Sustainability

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Abstract:The Copenhagen Accord performed a seizure in the COP ungainly crawl. The Accord's urgent combat against climate change and deep cuts in emissions require a policy reversal, ending the zero sum games on pledged caps, creating clarity on immediate marching directions and eliciting worldwide action by today's operational institutes at all levels. For reducing energy-related CO 2 emissions, all turbo drive components are available. First the global 2 °C ceiling needs translation into, by country, marching directions and indicative future paths of their national average CO 2 emissions per person. The latter intensity indicator is the product of three driving intensities: wealth per person, energy used for wealth production, and CO 2 emissions of energy use, all observed annually for virtually all countries in the world. Second, parties should commit to nearby year improvements on the three driving intensities. Third, transfers from rich to poor countries depend on ability to pay and on ability to spend, and on countries' mitigation progress. The approach dissolves main barriers to mitigation progress, like: outdated emissions baselines; illusory global instruments; bureaucratic MRV (monitoring, reporting and verification) concepts; blocked graduation of parties; unclear transfer mechanisms. In revamping the jammed COP rituals, UNFCCC now leaves operations to established global institutes and mainly to the parties acting in common resolve, stimulated and verified by a lightweight, transparent global framework.

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Climate change negotiations—legally binding treaty or voluntary agreements: lessons from international action on tuberculosis

Heywood

2013

WIREs Climate Change

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The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC negotiations in Durban and Doha agreed to develop a new Kyoto Protocol (KP) in which neither the form nor content of future agreements are set—they are to be determined over the 3 years remaining before the 2015 deadline. Alternate architectures proposed for an international agreement on climate change range from those that retain many of the top‐down, legally binding elements of the current KP through bottom‐up voluntary agreements that are not dependent on a legally binding treaty. Given this wide range of suggestions there is value in assessing experience in other areas of sustained international cooperation that have not involved treaties. One such effort is international cooperation to control tuberculosis (TB). In contrast to the legally binding treaty approach of the KP, international action on TB rests on a voluntary agreement by member states at the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1991, just a year before the UNFCCC was approved in Rio. An important characteristic of the TB agreement is that all countries (developed and developing) agreed on the importance of the problem, the targets set, and the ways in which measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) would occur. In contrast, the KP differentiated between nations, mandated targets for some and not others, and little progress has been made. The agreement to renegotiate the KP without commitment to form and content represents a new opportunity for climate change negotiations. Experience with international efforts to control TB provides an example of an international voluntary agreement that is yielding results. WIREs Clim Change 2013, 4:467–477. doi: 10.1002/wcc.237 This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > International Policy Framework

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Preparing the design of robust climate policy architectures

Abstract: Equity, Climate policy design principles, Diversity,

Cited by 11 publications

References 39 publications

Polluter-Pays-Principle: The Cardinal Instrument for Addressing Climate Change

Polluter-Pays-Principle: The Cardinal Instrument for Addressing Climate Change

A Turbo Drive for the Global Reduction of Energy-Related CO2 Emissions

Climate change negotiations—legally binding treaty or voluntary agreements: lessons from international action on tuberculosis

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