Presenting an economic interaction bi-level model between electricity retailer and customer in bilateral electricity market contract

Apornak, Kourosh; Soleymani, Soodabeh; Faghihi, Faramarz; Mozafari, Babak

doi:10.1007/s12046-022-01814-5

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 24 publications

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“…Due to the weight of renewable energy power consumption responsibility of large consumers' consumption, as well as the reality that the price of electricity in the spot market is generally higher than that in the medium-and long-term market, large consumers need to purchase the electricity they need from green and thermal power suppliers through multiple channels and in multiple ways at the same time. Under this premise, the green and thermal power suppliers will try to maximize their biddings in order to obtain the highest revenues, as they are sure that large consumers will buy a certain amount of electricity from them [30]. Since the marginal biddings of the green and thermal power suppliers will increase with the increase in contract electricity, the green and thermal power suppliers will make decisions based on this situation, i.e., the biddings to the large consumer 1 (LC1) will be higher than the biddings to the large consumer 2 (LC2), which are higher than the biddings to the large consumer 3 (LC3), and the biddings to the large consumer 3 (LC3) are higher than the biddings to the large consumer 4 (LC4).…”

Section: Analysis Of Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Construction and Application of the Double Game Model for Direct Purchase of Electricity by Large Consumers under Consideration of Risk Factors

Yu,

Zhang,

Cui

et al. 2024

Energies

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With the development of global clean energy and the implementation of carbon emission reduction policies, the direct purchase of electricity by large consumers has been increasingly promoted as a special form of electricity trading. Therefore, on the basis of the completion of low-carbon emission reduction targets in each country, how to rationalize the electricity purchase by large consumers in the electricity market so as to reduce their electricity purchase costs has become the main target of attention in each country. Currently, there are fewer studies in existing research on the direct electricity purchase strategy of large consumers under the consideration of the weight of consumption responsibility and risk. Based on this, this paper constructs a dual-game model for direct electricity purchase by large consumers based on the Stackelberg game and non-cooperative game theory. The concept of value at risk is further introduced, and the optimal strategy of direct electricity purchase by large consumers is proposed. The results of this study show that when market players make decisions on the purchase and sale of electricity, power suppliers will increase their biddings to obtain the highest returns, and large consumers can reduce the transaction costs by combining the medium- and long-term market with the spot market to purchase electricity. In the choice of electricity purchase market, with the increasing risk factor, large consumers shift from the risky spot market to the less risky medium- and long-term market and option market. This paper provides a reference for the issues of power suppliers’ contract bidding and large consumers’ electricity purchase strategy in the medium- and long-term contract transactions.

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Section: Analysis Of Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%