Private equity investment decisions in family firms: The role of human resources and agency costs

Exploring the relation between family involvement and firms' financial performance: A meta-analysis of main and moderator effects

“…It is usually discussed as the relationship between a manager, and how that manager represents an owner. However, it has also been used to characterize the relationship between other dyads (e.g., manager-employee, owner-employee, owner-owner, investor-owner) (Dawson, 2011). Among these dyads, there are two broad types of problems that may occur.…”

“…Among these dyads, there are two broad types of problems that may occur. The first is adverse selection which is the situation that arises when a principal mistakenly enters into a contract with an incompetent or unsuitable agent (Dawson, 2011). The second, moral hazard, occurs when an agent engages in activities that work in the favor of that agent, but work against the principal.…”

Human capital in family businesses: Focusing on the individual level

“…The closeness of the family/business relationship creates a unique context for human capital (both positive and negative), compared to non-family firms (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Human capital is also considered to be a crucial resource by outside investors considering whether to provide finance to or invest in family businesses (Dawson, 2011).…”

The impact of family CEO’s ownership and the moderating effect of the second largest owner in private family firms

“…Agency relationships in private family firms could exist among owners, causing owner related costs (Dawson 2011). A major governance problem in closely held companies is the majority shareholders' expropriation of minority shareholders due to the illiquidity of shares (Nagar et al 2011).…”