2011
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhr025
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Privatization and Risk Sharing: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China

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Cited by 291 publications
(124 citation statements)
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“…Firth, Lin and Zou (2010) find that state ownership (mutual fund) has a positive (negative) effect on the final compensation ratio suggesting that state shareholders have incentives to complete the reform quickly and exert political pressure on mutual funds to accept the terms without a fight. Li et al (2011) further document that the size of compensation paid is positively associated with both the proxy for risk-sharing gains by non-tradable shareholders when selling shares to tradable shareholders and the proxy for the price impact of more shares coming on the market following the reform. On 4 September 2005, the CSRC announced non-tradable share reform plans extending to all listed firms after successful piloting of the first batch of three companies on 9 May 2005 and the second batch of 42 companies on 20 June 2005.…”
Section: The Sssrmentioning
confidence: 81%
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“…Firth, Lin and Zou (2010) find that state ownership (mutual fund) has a positive (negative) effect on the final compensation ratio suggesting that state shareholders have incentives to complete the reform quickly and exert political pressure on mutual funds to accept the terms without a fight. Li et al (2011) further document that the size of compensation paid is positively associated with both the proxy for risk-sharing gains by non-tradable shareholders when selling shares to tradable shareholders and the proxy for the price impact of more shares coming on the market following the reform. On 4 September 2005, the CSRC announced non-tradable share reform plans extending to all listed firms after successful piloting of the first batch of three companies on 9 May 2005 and the second batch of 42 companies on 20 June 2005.…”
Section: The Sssrmentioning
confidence: 81%
“…On 4 September 2005, the CSRC announced non-tradable share reform plans extending to all listed firms after successful piloting of the first batch of three companies on 9 May 2005 and the second batch of 42 companies on 20 June 2005. 4 This SSSR granted legitimate trading rights to the state-owned shares of listed SOEs, opening up the gate to China's secondary privatization (Li et al 2011;Liao, Liu and Wang 2014). Over the ensuing years, the SSSR has brought dramatic changes in the ownership structure of Chinese listed firms.…”
Section: The Sssrmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The reform helped remove significant market friction, leading to better incentive alignment between controlling and minority shareholders (e.g., Firth, Lin, & Zou, 2010;Li, Wang, Cheung, & Jiang, 2011;Chen, Jin, & Yuan, 2011;Beltratti, Bortolotti, & Caccavaio, 2012;Chen, Chen, Schipper, Xu, & Xue, 2012;and Hou, Kuo, & Lee, 2012). In addition, according to Green, Morris, and Tang (2010), the reform led to a positive impact on transparency.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%