Programming semantics for multiprogrammed computations

Dennis, Jack B.; Horn, Earl C. Van

doi:10.1145/357980.357993

Cited by 257 publications

(146 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…From studying capabilities [DH65] in general, and especially from the clarifications about capability based security recently provided by Miller and Shapiro [MS03], we concluded that modeling collaborative behavior is crucial when modeling capabilities accurately. When propagating authority from one subject to another, the authority reducing behavior of the subjects involved should be taken into account.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

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A Practical Formal Model for Safety Analysis in Capability-Based Systems

Spiessens

Roy

2005

Trustworthy Global Computing

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Abstract. We present a formal system that models programmable abstractions for access control. Composite abstractions and patterns of arbitrary complexity are modeled as a configuration of communicating subjects. The subjects in the model can express behavior that corresponds to how information and authority are propagated in capability systems. The formalism is designed to be useful for analyzing how information and authority are confined in arbitrary configurations, but it will also be useful in the reverse sense, to calculate the necessary restrictions in a subject's behavior when a global confinement policy is given. We introduce a subclass of these systems we call "saturated", that can provide safe and tractable approximations for the safety properties in arbitrary configurations of collaborating entities.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…The security concept we call a capability was introduced by Dennis and Van Horn [DH65] in the 1965. The concept is very simple: make designation unforgeable and combine it with authority, then you have a capability.…”

Section: Capability Security and Capability Secure Languagesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Practical Formal Model for Safety Analysis in Capability-Based Systems

Spiessens

Roy

2005

Trustworthy Global Computing

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“…For components which a r e programs, t h i s problem i s o f t e n solved by d e f i n i n g s p e c i a l hardware i n s t r u c t i o n s and assuming t h e e x c l u s i v e e x e c u t i o n of t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s L 7,9,10,15,16 1. I n I 4 1 a model f o r p a r a l l e l computer systems w a s proposed i n which fundamental-mode flow t a b l e s are used t o d e s c r i b e t h e o p e r a t i o n of each component.…”

Section: Has Solved a S L I G H T L Y D I F F E R E N T V E R S I O Nmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mutual Exclusion Problem

Garg

2004

Concurrent and Distributed Computing in Java

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This paper d i s c u s s e s how n components, which may be programs o r c i r c u i t s , i n a computer system can be c o n t r o l l e d so t h a t (1) a t most one component may perform a designated "critical" o p e r a t i o n a t any i n s t a n t and (2) i f one component wants t o perform i t s c r i t i c a l operat i o n , i t i s e v e n t u a l l y allowed t o do so. This c o n t r o l problem i s known as t h e mutual e x c l u s i o n o r i n t e r l o c k problem. A summary of t h e flow t a b l e model* f o r computer systems i s given, I n t h i s model, a c o n t r o l a l g o r i t h m i s r e p r e s e n t e d by a flow table. The number of i n t e r n a l states i n t h e c o n t r o l flow t a b l e i s used as a measure of t h e complexity of c o n t r o l algorithms.A lower bound of n + 1 i n t e r n a l states i t o be n e c e s s a r y if the mutual e x c l u s i o n problem is t o be solved. S t a n f o r d University, Stanford, C a l i f o r n i a ( A p r i l 1970) e i problem which r e q u i r e t h e minimum number of i n t e r n a l s t a t e s a r e d e s c r i b e d and i t i s proved t h a t t h e s e procedures give c o r r e c t c o n t r o l s o l u t i o n s . Other so-called "unbiased" algorithms a r e described which r e q u i r e 2 . n ! i n t e r n a l s t a t e s but break t i e s i n t h e case of mulsiple r e q u e s t s i n f a v o r of t h e component t h a t l e a s t r e c e n t l y executed i t s c r i t i c a l o p e r a t i o n . The paper concludes with a discuss i o n of t h e t r a d e o f f s between c e n t r a l and d i s t r i b u t e d c o n t r o l algorithms. Procedures t o g e n e r a t e c o n t r o l flow tables f o r t h e mutual

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“…It started as a way to protect "primitive" resources such as memory segments [7], but was soon generalized [43] into a protected ability to invoke arbitrary services provided by other processes. For each process, there is a table associating small numbers (similar in spirit to Unix file descriptors) with the capabilities held by that process.…”

Section: Capability Operating Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Capability-Based Financial Instruments

Miller¹,

Morningstar²,

Frantz³

2001

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. Every novel cooperative arrangement of mutually suspicious parties interacting electronically -every smart contract -effectively requires a new cryptographic protocol. However, if every new contract requires new cryptographic protocol design, our dreams of cryptographically enabled electronic commerce would be unreachable. Cryptographic protocol design is too hard and expensive, given our unlimited need for new contracts.Just as the digital logic gate abstraction allows digital circuit designers to create large analog circuits without doing analog circuit design, we present cryptographic capabilities as an abstraction allowing a similar economy of engineering effort in creating smart contracts. We explain the E system, which embodies these principles, and show a covered-call-option as a smart contract written in a simple security formalism independent of cryptography, but automatically implemented as a cryptographic protocol coordinating five mutually suspicious parties.

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Programming semantics for multiprogrammed computations

Cited by 257 publications

References 10 publications

A Practical Formal Model for Safety Analysis in Capability-Based Systems

A Practical Formal Model for Safety Analysis in Capability-Based Systems

Mutual Exclusion Problem

Capability-Based Financial Instruments

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