Purification and roulette wheels

Greinecker, Michael; Podczeck, Konrad

doi:10.1007/s00199-014-0815-1

Cited by 10 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Therefore, we complement the important recent results obtained in Vives and Zandt (2007) and Van Zandt (2010). 7 See also recent papers of Greinecker and Podczeck (2014), Sun and Zhang (2014), and Yu (2014) for related problems. 8 In our definition of equilibria, distributional equilibria are not equivalent to equilibria in the sense of Schmeidler (1973).…”

Section: Introduction and Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 52%

Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities

et al. 2014

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We study equilibrium in large games of strategic complementarities (GSC) with differential information. We define an appropriate notion of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium and prove its existence. Furthermore, we characterize order-theoretic properties of the equilibrium set, provide monotone comparative statics for ordered perturbations of the space of games, and provide explicit algorithms for computing extremal equilibria. We complement the paper with new results on the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the sense of Balder and Rustichini (J Econ Theory 62(2):385-393, 1994) or Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77(2):330-353, 1997) for large GSC and provide an analogous characterization of the equilibrium set as in the case of distributional Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Finally, we apply our results to riot games, beauty contests, and common value auctions. In all cases, standard existence and comparative statics tools in the theory of supermodular games for finite numbers of agents do not apply in general, and new constructions are required.

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Section: Introduction and Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 52%

Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities

et al. 2014

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“…Formally, proving Theorem 7 amounts to proving a so‐called “purification”‐theorem for measure‐valued maps. Our theorem is related to but does not follow from existing results on the purification of measure‐valued maps such as Podczeck (2009), Loeb and Sun (2009), Wang and Zhang (2012), and Greinecker and Podczeck (2015). The additional complication we face comes from requiring the matching to be represented by a measurable, measure‐preserving isomorphism.…”

Section: Individualistic Representationmentioning

confidence: 90%

Pairwise Stable Matching in Large Economies

Greinecker

Kah

2021

ECTA

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We formulate a stability notion for two‐sided pairwise matching problems with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Matchings are formulated as joint distributions over the characteristics of the populations to be matched. Spaces of characteristics can be high‐dimensional and need not be compact. Stable matchings exist with and without transfers, and stable matchings correspond precisely to limits of stable matchings for finite‐agent models. We can embed existing continuum matching models and stability notions with transferable utility as special cases of our model and stability notion. In contrast to finite‐agent matching models, stable matchings exist under a general class of externalities.

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On Sufficiently-Diffused Information in Bayesian Games: A Dialectical Formalization

Khan

2017

Advances in Mathematical Economics

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Purification and roulette wheels

Cited by 10 publications

References 34 publications

Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities

Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities

Pairwise Stable Matching in Large Economies

On Sufficiently-Diffused Information in Bayesian Games: A Dialectical Formalization

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