Radical enactivism: A guide for the perplexed.

Abstract

In the last 20 years, cognitive science has been revolutionized by enactive cognition. However, claims by enactivists that enactive cognition reforms much of our thinking about the nature of minds, and our relationships with nature and each other, have not always been easy to follow and hence a certain perplexity which has been further confounded by arguments between various enactivists. This article offers some clarification of some of the central claims of enactivism by drawing on past figures in philosophy and psychology, borrowing and extending already popularized metaphors, elucidating some key concepts, and explicating one of the central arguments within enactivism. Combining relevant inferences and intuitions from the past with recent ones from radical enactivism facilitates the emergence of a more responsible and responsive understanding of human nature: one that allows us to attune to each other and to nature more fully. Public Significance StatementOne of a number of approaches to embodied cognition, radical enactivism emphasizes the fact that our fast, intuitive, animal thinking mostly dominates our slower, social linguistic thinking. Separating and reintegrating the two furthers the pioneering work undertaken by Wittgenstein and holds the promise of rectifying our alienation from each other and from nature. This article discusses this important development in cognitive science.