Reasons for Belief

Ginsborg, Hannah

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00562.x

Cited by 53 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…20 I am happy to assume basing is causal, but even if that is wrong because there are exceptions (see Korcz 1997Korcz , 2010, commonly proffered putative non-causal bases are still antecedent to the belief formed on their basis (e.g., see Lehrer's (1990) famous gypsy lawyer case) so that is no help to the received view. 21 For other complications with this revised proposal see Ginsborg (2006).…”

Section: Seeing Thatmentioning

confidence: 97%

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Basic factive perceptual reasons

Schnee

2015

Philos Stud

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Many epistemologists have recently defended views on which all evidence is true or perceptual reasons are facts (including McDowell, Pritchard, Williamson, and Littlejohn). On such views a common account of basic perceptual reasons is that the fact that one sees that p is one's reason for believing that p (McDowell, Pritchard, Millar, Haddock). I argue that that account is wrong; rather, in the basic case the fact that p itself is one's reason for believing that p. I show that my proposal is better motivated, solves a fundamental objection that the received view faces, and illuminates the nature of reasons for belief.

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Section: Seeing Thatmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…On the reasons-for versus reasons-why distinction seeAudi (1986 andGinsborg (2006). I will assume that all reasons-for are reasons-why, but not all reasons-why are reasons-for.…”

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confidence: 98%

Basic factive perceptual reasons

Schnee

2015

Philos Stud

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“…We can then talk about seeing that p, if p is actually the case, and talk about that it merely seemed to us that p was the case, if p isn't the case. Experiences in this way purport to reveal to us how things are by making it appear to us that p is the case (McDowell 2008b: 202–3, 207–8, 260; Ginsborg 2006: 293).…”

Section: Brandom Mcdowell and Sellarsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reinterpreting Sellars in the Light of Brandom, McDowell, and A. D. Smith

Olsen¹

2010

European J of Philosophy

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The intent of this paper is to indicate a development in Sellars' writings which points in another direction than the interpretations offered by Brandom, McDowell, and A. D. Smith. Brandom and McDowell have long claimed to preserve central insights of Sellars's theory of perception; however, they disagree over what exactly these insights are. A. D. Smith has launched a critique of Sellars in chapter 2 of his book The Problem of Perception which is so penetrating that it would tear Sellars' philosophy of perception apart if it were adequate. However, I try to show firstly that Brandom's and McDowell's interpretations are unsatisfying when Sellars' late writings are taking into consideration. And secondly that we can give another interpretation of Sellars that is not vulnerable to some of the problems of which Smith accuses Sellars.

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“… 6 The considerations raised in the last two paragraphs are developed in more detail in Ginsborg (forthcoming). …”

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confidence: 99%

“… 23 For this idea, and also its relevance to the case of cognition, see Ginsborg 1997, 2006a, and forthcoming. …”

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Empirical Concepts and the Content of Experience

Ginsborg¹

2006

European J of Philosophy

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The view that the content of experience is conceptual is often felt to conflict with the empiricist intuition that experience precedes thought, rather than vice versa. This concern is explicitly articulated by Ayers as an objection both to McDowell and Davidson, and to the conceptualist view more generally. The paper aims to defuse the objection in its general form by presenting a version of conceptualism which is compatible with empiricism. It proposes an account of observational concepts on which possession of such a concept involves more than the ability for perceptual discrimination, but less than the capacity to employ the concept in inferences: it consists in the capacity to perceptually discriminate objects with the awareness that one is discriminating as one ought. This understanding of concept-possession allows us make sense of experiences' having conceptual content without supposing that the subject must grasp the relevant concepts prior to having those experiences.The issue of the nonconceptual content of experience has been a subject of lively debate in recent philosophy of mind and epistemology.

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Reasons for Belief

Cited by 53 publications

References 21 publications

Basic factive perceptual reasons

Basic factive perceptual reasons

Reinterpreting Sellars in the Light of Brandom, McDowell, and A. D. Smith

Empirical Concepts and the Content of Experience

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