Reference the untouchable. On the limits of revising concepts using the method of cases

Abstract

The paper investigates to what extent the method of cases can be interpreted as either a descriptive or a normative enterprise. I demonstrate that although most instances of the method of cases in most philosophical theories could be interpreted as being intended to either discover or revise the meaning of their target concepts, within a theory of reference this method cannot be used to shift the meaning of the concept of reference. The reason for this is that intuitions of extension in a theory of reference constitute a set of data that needs to be explained, while in most other philosophical theories they could either be abandoned in favor of intuitions of intension or serve as a criterion for the adequacy of the proposed definition of the target concept. This feature of a theory of reference is caused by the fact that an implicit understanding of what reference is in a theory of reference is usually assumed and is out of discussion. In effect, the claim in paradigmatic instances of the method of cases within a theory of reference does not concern whether an expression does or does not refer in particular cases, but rather what the reference of a certain expression is, and therefore it cannot be justified by intuitions of intension.

Concept Revision, Concept Application and the Role of Intuitions in Gettier Cases

“…For example, Andow (2020) has argued in favour of such a view. His account however differs from the one presented above, since Andow does not agree with the Deutsch's main claim about the justification for main claims in the Method of Cases, and does not focus on the dialectical role of intuitions of intension (for discussion of Andow's stance see Sękowski 2023). defined by philosophers during analyses.…”