Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking

Helfer, Laurence R.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.459740

Cited by 173 publications

(177 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…In the area of plant genetic resources, however, Raustiala and Victor (2004) found that distinct, nonnested regimes had begun to overlap: regimes operating in issue areas previously seen as distinct, such as biodiversity and trade, had both come to affect plant genetic resources. In this situation rule inconsistencies can easily arise-indeed, actors intentionally create inconsistencies through 'regime shifting' (Helfer, 2004)-and are diffi cult to resolve. Inconsistencies also create opportunities for forum shopping by targets, which may undercut regulation.…”

Section: Transnational Climate Change Governance As a Regime Complexmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Those arguments are bounded in two signifi cant ways. First, they focus predominantly on interstate regimes (Aggarwal, 1998;Alter and Meunier, 2009;Helfer, 2004;Oberthür and Gehring, 2011;Raustiala and Victor, 2004), albeit with a few signifi cant exceptions (Green, 2011;Kelley, 2009). Second, they are primarily concerned with regimes that promulgate legally binding rules; in the 'soft law' world of RSS a number of implications do not hold.…”

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confidence: 99%

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The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change

Abbott

2012

Environ Plann C Gov Policy

426

212

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Abstract. In climate change, as in other areas, recent years have produced a 'Cambrian explosion' of transnational institutions, standards, fi nancing arrangements, and programs. As a result, climate governance has become complex, fragmented, and decentralized, operating without central coordination. Most studies of climate governance focus on inter state institutions. In contrast, I map a diff erent realm of climate change governance: the diverse array of transnational schemes. I analyze this emerging system in terms of two theoretical frameworks developed to describe, explain, and evaluate complex governance arrangementsregime complex theory and polycentric governance theory-revealing fruitful avenues for positive and normative research. I conclude by arguing that the benefi ts of institutional complexity could be increased, and the costs reduced, through nonhierarchical 'orchestration' of climate change governance, in which international organizations or other appropriate authorities support and steer transnational schemes that further global public interests.

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Section: Transnational Climate Change Governance As a Regime Complexmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change

Abbott

2012

Environ Plann C Gov Policy

426

212

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“…Die Einschätzung, dass bei den Bern-Plus-Elementen einseitig auf die Interessen der Rechteinhaber Rücksicht genommen wurde, wird auch in der Literatur relativ einhellig geteilt (vgl. Matthew 2002;Kretschmer 2003;Helfer 2004;Heineke 2006). Ein profaner Grund hierfür ist das historische Zuspätkommen von Akteuren aus dem Bereich der "Zivilgesellschaft", halten doch beispielsweise Braithwaite und Drahos (2000: 72, unsere Hervorh.…”

Section: Regulierungswettbewerb In Den Bereichen Politik Und Marktunclassified

10 Internationale und nichtstaatliche Organisationen im Wettbewerb um Regulierung: Schauplatz Urheberrecht

Dobusch¹,

Quack²

2009

Die Organisierte Welt

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“…This same phenomenon is often referred to as "forum shopping" (Busch 2007;Sykes 2008), "regime shifting" (Helfer 2004), or "institutional choice" (Jupille and Snidal 2006;Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal 2013). As scholars emphasize the diversity of institutionalized cooperation in world politics, the choice of partners for collaboration has become increasingly important.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Choosing international organizations: When do states and the World Bank collaborate on environmental projects?

2014

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While international cooperation research emphasizes institutional design, states mostly interact with existing organizations. How do states choose organizations for cooperation? We develop a theory of agency choice for development projects, emphasizing the importance of domestic institutions, the scope of cooperation, and the resources of the implementing agency. If states are to cooperate with funding agencies that have abundant resources, such as the World Bank, they must accept more stringent conditions on project implementation. We argue states accept the stringent conditions that resourceful organizations demand if the public goods from project implementation are highly valuable. Empirically, this is the case for democratic states, large projects, and projects that produce national instead of global public goods. We test this theory using data on 2,882 Global Environment Facility (GEF) projects, 1991-2011. The GEF offers an ideal case because various implementing agencies are responsible for the actual projects. States implement projects in collaboration with the World Bank, which has the most expertise and resources among the GEF's implementing agencies, if their regime type is democracy, the project size is large, and the benefits are primarily national. Qualitative evidence sheds light on causal mechanisms.

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Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking

Abstract: restating and reviewing claim by developed countries that intellectual property rights "attract foreign investment, increase taxes, create new jobs, and facilitate technology transfer," and citing numerous supporting authorities) (footnotes omitted).

Cited by 173 publications

References 16 publications

The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change

The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change

10 Internationale und nichtstaatliche Organisationen im Wettbewerb um Regulierung: Schauplatz Urheberrecht

Choosing international organizations: When do states and the World Bank collaborate on environmental projects?

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