Regret under different auction designs: the case of English and Dutch auctions

Malekovic, Ninoslav; Goutas, Lazaros; Sutanto, Juliana; Galletta, Dennis F.

doi:10.1007/s12525-019-00355-w

Cited by 11 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 58 publications

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“…Each price searcher finally chooses the lowest price (similar to Dutch auctions [20]), or chooses the most ideal seller after comprehensively considering the price, electricity quantity and trading time period. If the opaque mode is employed, the trading system specifies a bidding time period during which the searcher cannot see any bidding information, and the lowest price or the second-lowest price will be cleared according to the trading system settings (similar to the firstprice sealed auction or second-price sealed auction respectively [21,22]). If the bidding price, declared electricity quantity and trading time period cannot meet the searcher's expectations, the searcher may also abandon the current round of price searching.…”

Section: Clearing Process Of Market Entitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A new double‐market parallel trading mechanism for competitive electricity markets

Shang

Jiang

Gao

et al. 2022

IET Renewable Power Gen

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The current electricity market trading mechanism mainly includes the bilateral negotiation transaction and centralized transaction, with defects such as information asymmetry, insufficient competition, and weak price discovery. Thus, a new double-market parallel trading mechanism is proposed to improve the efficiency of the competitive electricity market in this paper. Regard the electricity market as a price-searching market and divide into two sub-markets composed of a price-searching market for buyers and a price-searching market for sellers. Market entities can trade synchronously in two sub-markets as price searchers or bidders. Searchers are responsible for organizing transactions in line with the market clearing rule library, and bidders participate in transactions initiated by searchers. Under the parallel mechanism, the traditional trading mechanism is also applicable. the framework of the proposed mechanism is presented from four aspects, including the description, clearing process, operation mode, and linkage between two sub-markets. Then, a market clearing model of the proposed mechanism is built with several traditional transaction modes as special cases of the presented double-market parallel transactions. Finally, taking the centralized transaction as an example, results show that the proposed mechanism can effectively provide market entities more chances to win contracts, and enhance the market liquidity.

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Section: Clearing Process Of Market Entitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A new double‐market parallel trading mechanism for competitive electricity markets

Shang

Jiang

Gao

et al. 2022

IET Renewable Power Gen

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“…In reality, the factual condition shows that there are still many disputes over taxes, customs and excise, and local-taxes and levies that the tax courts in Indonesia must emphasize. Table 1 summarizes the number of disputes by appeal or defendant during 2014-2020 with 86,349 dispute files, while Table 2 summarizes the settlement of 72,314 tax disputes in 2014-2020 [2].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The auction sale of mortgage objects to determine the next authorized holder is mentioned in Article 6 of the UUHT. Sale through public auction is based on the executorial title that is contained in the mortgage certificate as referred to in Article 14 paragraph (2). It should be following the procedures specified in the legislation for repayment of the dependent's receivables with the right to take precedence over other creditors.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legal Protection for Goodwill Customers in The Purchase of Mortgage Guarantee

Parmo¹

2021

Proceedings From the 1st International Conference on Law and Human Rights, ICLHR 2021, 14-15 April 2021, Jakarta, Indonesia

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Irregularities have been found in the sale and purchase processes, especially among good-faith buyers in the purchase of collateral objects. Disputes and claims over collateral objects purchased by parties third in the District Court often occur. This descriptive legal research was carried out to obtain relevant data to the research problem. Secondary data consisting of primary legal materials, secondary legal materials and tertiary legal materials were regarded. It is concluded that if done based on the procedure, the purchase of collateral objects by good faith buyers is valid, and the agreement cannot be withdrawn other than by an agreement between the two parties or for reasons determined by law. The board of judge tends to perceive the auction buyers as good faith buyers without further examining the legality of the object for they believe any objects sold in an auction is legal as the auction is carried out by a trustworthy institution. Therefore, good faith buyers will obtain legal protection despite the objects are handed out by unauthorized party.

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“…In the context of this study, particularly livestock marketing, there are suggestions that emerging technologies (digital platforms) can transform the structure of "place, practices and circumstances" (Avram et al, 2017). Against the challenges faced in rural markets, and the urgent need for transforming these rural markets, the potential benefits which can be derived from adopting digital platforms (electronic markets) are difficult to dismiss (Malekovic, Goutas, Sutanto & Galletta, 2019). However, the urgency of the situation creates a danger of adopting tools which can further exacerbate problems within the system.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Potential of Digital Platforms in Revitalising the Livestock System in Rural Zimbabwe

Gwaka¹

2020

Preprint

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Livestock contribute towards household food security in rural communities through income generation and provision of animal-source food. However, livestock system are fragile for example, in Zimbabwe, communities face challenges such as fewer buyers, poor infrastructure, and information asymmetry when selling livestock. Emerging digital platforms promise opportunities to address these challenge but only anecdotal evidence exist. This paper uses data from Beitbridge to explore the potential of digital platforms to revitalise the livestock auction system. Study findings show that digital platforms are designed with affordances which can help overcome challenges within the livestock system. However, these digital platforms are also fraught with hidden complexities such as power dynamics. Thus, despite digital platforms’ affordances, their design inherently extends beyond technical functions. Therefore, there is an urgent need for discussions exploring the contrast between affordances and complexities to enable target users to make informed decisions on the adoption and use of digital platforms.

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Regret under different auction designs: the case of English and Dutch auctions

Cited by 11 publications

References 58 publications

A new double‐market parallel trading mechanism for competitive electricity markets

A new double‐market parallel trading mechanism for competitive electricity markets

Legal Protection for Goodwill Customers in The Purchase of Mortgage Guarantee

The Potential of Digital Platforms in Revitalising the Livestock System in Rural Zimbabwe

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