Reinterpreting Sellars in the Light of Brandom, McDowell, and A. D. Smith

Olsen, Niels Skovgaard

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2009.00360.x

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…35 Philosophy Department Rice University NOTES 1 Wilfrid Sellars is frequently thought to have also held such a view and to have differed from Broad, Lewis, and Price only in rejecting the idea that the sensory component, 'the given', is epistemically significant (Coates, 2007;Smith, 2002). However, Niels Skovgaard Olsen has recently convincingly argued that Sellars's developed view was in fact quite different (Olsen, 2009). 2 Lyons and Tucker sometimes call the first event a 'sensation'.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experience, Seemings, and Evidence

Reiland

2015

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Many people have recently argued that we need to distinguish between experiences and seemings and that this has consequences for views about how perception provides evidence. In this article I spell out my take on these issues by doing three things. First, I distinguish between mere sensations like seeing pitch black all around you and perceptual experiences like seeing a red apple. Both have sensory phenomenology in presenting us with sensory qualities like colors, being analog in Dretske's sense, and being fine‐grained. However, only the latter have furthermore a perceptual phenomenology characterized by objectification and related dualities of perspectivality/completion and variation/constancy. Second, I elaborate on the reasons for thinking that both mere sensations and perceptual experiences (= experiences) need to be distinguished from accompanying seemings that passively assign things into conceptual categories and thereby tell you something about them. For example, when you look at a red apple and have the relevant recognitional abilities it will also normally seem to you that this is an apple. Finally, I argue that the best version of the popular dogmatist view about evidence is one which claims that it's neither experiences nor seemings by themselves, but rather the right sorts of composites of experiences and seemings that provide evidence.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experience, Seemings, and Evidence

Reiland

2015

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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“…29 Being that justification is one of the central problems in epistemology, I call this critique "epistemic". 30 Huemer (2005), Olsen (2009), Barber (2011). critique are often intertwined, which can prevent us from clearly viewing their targets as well as the success of their attacks.…”

Section: Mcdowell's Critique Of Brandom's View Of Observational Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

“… Brandom (2000, 119 -120).22 Brandom (2000, 113 -114).23 Brandom (2000, 114 -115).24 Brandom (2000, 116 -118).25 Brandom (2000, 120 -121).26 Huemer (2005),Olsen (2009),Barber (2011).…”

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confidence: 99%

McDowell and Brandom on Observational Knowledge

Čukljević¹

2021

filozofia

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In this paper, I will analyze whether John McDowell's critique of Robert Brandom's account of observational knowledge is a success. First, I will present Brandom's view of observational knowledge. Then I will lay out the main objections that McDowell raises against it. I will argue that McDowell's arguments can be divided into semantic and epistemic. The analysis will show that the epistemic arguments face serious difficulty and that McDowell should focus on semantic critique.

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Sellars Contra McDowell on Intuitional Content and the Myth of the Given

Christias

2015

Philosophia

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The aim of this paper is to properly situate and contrast McDowell's and Sellars' views on intuitional content and relate them to their corresponding views on the myth of the Given. Although McDowell's and Sellars' views on what McDowell calls 'intuitional' content seem at first strikingly similar, at a deeper level they are radically different. It will be suggested that this divergence is intimately related to their different understanding of what the myth of the Given consists in and how it should be best avoided. It will also be argued that certain McDowell-inspired objections against the viability of the Sellarsian concept of the Categorial Given actually misconstrue the place of this notion in Sellars' system. If the myth of the Categorial Given can be considered as a genuine version of the Myth (and McDowell has offered no compelling reasons for thinking otherwise) then McDowell's account of intuitional content does indeed fall prey to it. I shall further argue that a McDowell-inspired objection against Sellars to the effect that his account of proper sensibles compromises the openness of intuitional content to the world ultimately fails, and, finally, I shall suggest that Sellars' views on proper sensibles and intuitional content provide a more promising account of the way our thought and experience can be rationally open to the world itself than McDowell's position.

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Reinterpreting Sellars in the Light of Brandom, McDowell, and A. D. Smith

Cited by 4 publications

References 30 publications

Experience, Seemings, and Evidence

Experience, Seemings, and Evidence

McDowell and Brandom on Observational Knowledge

Sellars Contra McDowell on Intuitional Content and the Myth of the Given

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