2018
DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12244
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Relative Target Setting and Cooperation

Abstract: A large stream of work on relative performance evaluation highlights the benefits of using information about peer performance in contracting. In contrast, the potential costs of discouraging cooperation among peers have received much less attention. The purpose of our study is to examine how the importance of cooperation affects the use of information about peer performance in target setting, also known as relative target setting. Specifically, we use data from an industrial services company where business uni… Show more

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Cited by 21 publications
(5 citation statements)
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References 75 publications
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“…This effect is consistent with a study described above (Hansen & Van der Stede, 2004). Chow, Cooper and Haddad (1991) Experimental Truth on Pay Schemes Dechow and Sloan (1991) Archival Analysis Ratcheting CEO Pay Defond and Park (1997) Archival Analysis Smoothing income on Future Earnings Chowdhury (2006) Archival Analysis Manager Performance and Discounts Indjejikian and Nanda (2002) Archival Analysis Meeting Targets Consecutively Holzhacker, Kramer, Matějka, and Hoffmeister (2018) Archival Analysis Relative target setting and cooperation Armstrong, Chau, Ittner and Xiao (2017) Archival Analysis Target Ratcheting in CEO incentives Brahm and Poblete (2017) Experimental Ratcheting in a Multiproduct Firm Kuroki (2018) Archival Analysis Budget Ratcheting Under Zero-Profit Incentive Cardella and Depew (2016).…”
Section: Target Adjustmentsupporting
confidence: 82%
“…This effect is consistent with a study described above (Hansen & Van der Stede, 2004). Chow, Cooper and Haddad (1991) Experimental Truth on Pay Schemes Dechow and Sloan (1991) Archival Analysis Ratcheting CEO Pay Defond and Park (1997) Archival Analysis Smoothing income on Future Earnings Chowdhury (2006) Archival Analysis Manager Performance and Discounts Indjejikian and Nanda (2002) Archival Analysis Meeting Targets Consecutively Holzhacker, Kramer, Matějka, and Hoffmeister (2018) Archival Analysis Relative target setting and cooperation Armstrong, Chau, Ittner and Xiao (2017) Archival Analysis Target Ratcheting in CEO incentives Brahm and Poblete (2017) Experimental Ratcheting in a Multiproduct Firm Kuroki (2018) Archival Analysis Budget Ratcheting Under Zero-Profit Incentive Cardella and Depew (2016).…”
Section: Target Adjustmentsupporting
confidence: 82%
“…It is worth noting that the above arguments hold because we follow Meyer and Vickers () and assume no strategic interaction between own and peer effort choice, which rules out potential weaknesses of RPE such as collusion, sabotage, or lack of cooperation (Lazear ; Gibbons and Murphy ; Lazear and Oyer ; Holzhacker et al ) . Otherwise, the manager has incentives to reduce peer performance because it increases future compensation, either through a lower target (in case of ex ante RPE) or through a more favorable assessment of current own performance relative to peer performance (ex post RPE).…”
Section: Theoretical Model and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Literature shows that supervisors use diverse information sources to set employees’ targets (e.g., Indjejikian and Nanda [2002], Leone and Rock [2002], Bouwens and Kroos [2011], Aranda et al [2014], Bol and Lill [2015], Holzhacker et al. [2019]). Experimental evidence by Feichter [2023] highlights the role of a supervisor's past performance in lower‐level jobs.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%