Reliability in the U.S. electricity industry under new environmental regulations

Burtraw, Dallas; Palmer, Karen; Paul, Anthony; Beasley, Blair; Woerman, Matt

doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2013.06.070

Cited by 23 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…When new Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) affecting coal-fired power plants take effectlikely in 2015-2016they will likely be so stringent that SO 2 constraints under CSAPR will be rendered non-binding in one of the two SO 2 trading zones. Further, the MATS explicitly do not allow trading, and so assuming these rules are finalized and implemented as expected, there will be only a minimal market for SO 2(Burtraw, et al 2012).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The SO₂Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment

Schmalensee

Stavins

2013

Journal of Economic Perspectives

192

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Two decades have passed since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 launched a grand experiment in market-based environmental policy: the SO2 cap-and-trade system. That system performed well but created four striking ironies: First, by creating this system to reduce SO2 emissions to curb acid rain, the government did the right thing for the wrong reason. Second, a substantial source of this system's cost-effectiveness was an unanticipated consequence of earlier railroad deregulation. Third, it is ironic that cap-and-trade has come to be demonized by conservative politicians in recent years, as this market-based, cost-effective policy innovation was initially championed and implemented by Republican administrations. Fourth, court decisions and subsequent regulatory responses have led to the collapse of the SO2 market, demonstrating that what the government gives, the government can take away.

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confidence: 99%

The SO₂Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment

Schmalensee

Stavins

2013

Journal of Economic Perspectives

192

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“…Indeed, as shown by, e.g., Roberts and Spence (1976) and Kwerel (1977), it may be optimal from the point of view of society to combine a certificate system with an additional price instrument such as floor and ceiling prices (a so-called "hybrid system"). More recently, Pizer (2003), Jacoby and Ellerman (2004), Burtraw and Palmer (2006), Goulder and Parry (2008) showed how a system of "safety valves" (ceiling and floor prices) under uncertainty may increase the efficiency of a dynamic emissions certificate system that allows banking. 17 Relating this to the cases considered in this article, it would seem logical to address uncertainty by adding such safety valves to the black certificate system rather than to add certificate systems of green and white electricity, if reduction in the emissions of greenhouse gases is the single ultimate goal while recognizing uncertainty.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simultaneous Use of Black, Green, and White Certificate Systems

Amundsen¹,

Bye²

2018

The Energy Journal

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We formulate a long run model with black, green and white certificate markets that function in conjunction with an electricity market. The markets function well together in the sense that a common equilibrium solution exists, where all targets are satisfied (e.g., the share of green electricity and share of energy saving/ efficiency increase). The equilibrium solution adapts to changing targets but it is, in general, impossible to tell whether this will lead to more, less, or unchanged consumption of "black," "green" or "white" electricity. Hence, if the long run target is to expand the capacity of green electricity generation and energy savings to certain given levels, then these markets may not be the best to use. To obtain clear results, specific parameter values and functional forms are needed. An example based on Norwegian data is provided. In addition, gains and losses in terms of consumers' and producers' surpluses are calculated.

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“…The US electricity sector was chosen for characterization of the country as the greatest power in the global economy, in addition to the degree of excellence of its operations, considered reference. Also, several previous research has analyzed the American electricity sector (CARLEY; ANDREWS, 2012;BURTRAW et al, 2013;YI, 2015;SAUNORIS;SHERIDAN, 2013). On the economic importance of the United States, Ceceña (2002) states that the country has technological superiority in almost all strategic fields of competition; superiority in control of natural sources of strategic resources; productive network of greater depth and density in the world; management of more diverse labor market from the cultural, geographical and levels and types of knowledge points of view.…”

Section: Profile Of the Electric Sector In The United Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sticky costs: An Empirical Study in Brazilian and the North American Companies of the Energy Sector

Santos¹,

Catapan²,

Oliveira³

et al. 2017

REB

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This study aims to determine the presence of stick costs (sticky costs) in Brazilian and US power companies. To this end, we collected data revenues, sold merchandise cost and taxes of 33 Brazilian power companies that are listed on the BM & FBOVESPA and 25 American companies of the same sector that trade their shares on the NASDAQ and the NYSE during the years 2004 to 2013. The research findings showed that the sticky costs can be verified in the Brazilian context, since for every percentage increase of 1% of revenue the variable costs increased 1.32%, while for 1% decrease in revenues, expenses 0.78% decrease variables. Since, in the American context, there has been the presence of sticky costs, given the linearity of the increase and decrease of the variable costs due to increased or decreased revenue. These results show the differences in the management of Brazilian and North American power companies.

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Reliability in the U.S. electricity industry under new environmental regulations

Cited by 23 publications

References 1 publication

The SO₂Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment

The SO₂Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment

Simultaneous Use of Black, Green, and White Certificate Systems

Sticky costs: An Empirical Study in Brazilian and the North American Companies of the Energy Sector

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Reliability in the U.S. electricity industry under new environmental regulations

Cited by 23 publications

References 1 publication

The SO2Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment

The SO2Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment

Simultaneous Use of Black, Green, and White Certificate Systems

Sticky costs: An Empirical Study in Brazilian and the North American Companies of the Energy Sector

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

The SO₂Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment

The SO₂Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment