Remembering is not a kind of knowing

Lai, Changsheng

doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03814-8

Cited by 5 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 69 publications

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“…However, unbeknownst to me, there was a faulty circuit in my neighbourhood at that moment, automatically turning all electric appliances in this area off. Luckily, somehow, except for mine (for similar cases, see Lai, 2022b; Bernecker, 2010, ch. 3).…”

Section: Memory Belief and Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

“…For more about Bernecker's grammatical criterion and the relation between propositional memory, semantic memory, and episodic memory, see Bernecker (2010, pp. 19-31); Lai (2022aLai ( , 2022b. Delving deeper into the problem of taxonomy will take us too far afield from the problem this paper primarily seeks to address.…”

Section: Laimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Elsewhere (Lai, 2022a(Lai, , 2022b, I have also argued that ETM is false. Here, I shall only give a brief sketch of my arguments instead of repeating them in full detail.…”

Section: Memory B Elief and K Nowledg Ementioning

confidence: 99%

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Memory belief is weak

Lai

2023

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In a recent influential paper, Hawthorne et al. (2016) argue that the epistemic standard for rationally believing a proposition is lower than for rationally asserting it. In a slogan: "belief is weak". Given the close connection between knowledge and the norm of assertion (as well as the norm of belief) in contemporary epistemological literature, this debate has been extended to consider whether belief is weaker than knowledge (see Rothschild, 2020;Schulz, 2021aSchulz, , 2021bWilliamson, 2020). Generally, epistemologists who advocate that belief is weak reject two forms of entitlement equality: EE-K: The epistemic standard required by rational belief is the same as for knowledge (cf. the knowledge norm of belief, Williamson, 2000). EE-A:The epistemic standard required by rational belief is the same as for assertion (cf. the knowledge norm of assertion, Williamson, 2000).

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Section: Memory Belief and Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Laimentioning

confidence: 99%

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Memory belief is weak

Lai

2023

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“…Following Bernecker (2010), this paper focuses on an inclusive type of memory: propositional memory, viz. 'remembering that' (see also Martin & Deutscher 1966;Lai 2022aLai , 2022b. It refers to any substituend of the schema 'S remembers that p' and thus can be both episodic and semantic (see Bernecker 2010: 20).…”

Section: Preliminariesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If only a small portion of our memory beliefs are plagued, then the alleged 'sceptical' conclusion may not bring in too much impact. After all, it does not seem to be astonishing that sometimes we fail to know what we seem to remember (see Lai 2022aLai , 2022bBernecker 2010).…”

Section: Andrew Moon On Memory Scepticismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Memory scepticism and the Pritchardean solution

Lai

2023

AJPH

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A large portion of our knowledge seems to rest on our memories, while memory scepticism poses challenges to our memory knowledge. This paper will delve into different forms of memory scepticism. The goal of this paper is twofold: First, drawing on Moon (2017) and Frise (2022), I compare and criticize various forms of sceptical arguments provided by them. Meanwhile, the two most threatening arguments are picked out: the Russellian argument and the argument from doubtful reliability. Second, I demonstrate that the two arguments are essentially based on the closure principle and the underdetermination principle, respectively, and hence, Pritchard's biscopic anti-sceptical proposal is applicable. A Pritchardean solution to the problem of memory scepticism will then be sketched out.

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Remembering requires no reliability

Lai

2023

Philos Stud

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Remembering is not a kind of knowing

Cited by 5 publications

References 69 publications

Memory belief is weak

Memory belief is weak

Memory scepticism and the Pritchardean solution

Remembering requires no reliability

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