Reputation, group structure and social tensions

Rohner, Dominic

doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.10.008

“…Poverty and natural resource abundance also have been found to fuel conflict, as the former reduces the opportunity cost of fighting, while the latter results in a larger "pie" that can be appropriated (Torvik, 2002;Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). The importance of ethnic polarization is emphasized, among others, by Esteban and Ray (2008, 2011), Caselli and Coleman (2012 and Rohner (2011). Some theories try to explain, as we do, why civil conflicts recur.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 91%

War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict

Rohner

¹

,

Thoenig

²

,

Zilibotti

³

2011

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We construct a theory of persistent civil conflicts, where persistence is driven by the endogenous dynamics of inter-ethnic trust and trade. In times of peace, agents belonging to two groups are randomly matched to trade bilaterally. Trade hinges on trust and cooperation. The onset of conflict signals that the aggressor has a low propensity to cooperate, harming future trust and trade. Agents observe the history of conflicts and update their beliefs over time. The theory predicts that civil wars are persistent. Moreover, even accidental conflicts that do not reflect economic fundamentals erode trust, and can plunge a society into a vicious cycle of recurrent conflicts (a war trap). The incidence of conflict can be reduced by policies abating cultural barriers, fostering inter-ethnic trade and human capital, and shifting beliefs. Coercive peace policies, such as peacekeeping forces or externally imposed regime changes, have no enduring effects.

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“…Padró i Miquel (2007) focuses on autocrats’ exploitation of ethnic fears in order to extract rents while imposing severe distortions on the economy. Rohner (2011) and Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2011a) model the two‐way interaction between conflict and trust.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict

Caselli

¹

,

Coleman

²

2013

Journal of the European Economic Association

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When considering engaging in conflict to secure control of a resource, a group needs to predict the amount of post‐conflict leakage due to infiltration by members of losing groups. We use this insight to explain why conflict often takes place along ethnic lines, why some ethnic groups are more often in conflict than others (and some never are), and why the same groups are sometimes in conflict and sometimes at peace. In our theory ethnic markers help enforce group membership: in homogeneous societies members of the losing group can more easily pass themselves as members of the winning group, and this reduces the chances of conflict as an equilibrium outcome. We derive a number of implications of the model relating social, political, and economic indicators such as the incidence of conflict, the distance between ethnic groups, group sizes, income inequality, and expropriable resources. One of the insights is that the incidence of ethnic conflict is nonmonotonic in expropriable resources as a fraction of total resources, with a low incidence for either low or high values. We use the model’s predictions to interpret historical examples of conflict associated with skin pigmentation, body size, language, and religion.

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“…The importance of luck and the persistent e¤ects of negative shocks link our contribution to Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997). Also related to our research are the recent papers by Aghion et al (2010;2011) focusing on the relation between public policy, on the one hand, and beliefs and norms of cooperation in the labor market, on the other hand.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 94%

War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust, and Conflict

Rohner

¹

,

Thoenig

²

,

Zilibotti

³

2013

The Review of Economic Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We construct a theory of persistent civil conflicts, where persistence is driven by the endogenous dynamics of inter-ethnic trust and trade. In times of peace, agents belonging to two groups are randomly matched to trade bilaterally. Trade hinges on trust and cooperation. The onset of conflict signals that the aggressor has a low propensity to cooperate, harming future trust and trade. Agents observe the history of conflicts and update their beliefs over time. The theory predicts that civil wars are persistent. Moreover, even accidental conflicts that do not reflect economic fundamentals erode trust, and can plunge a society into a vicious cycle of recurrent conflicts (a war trap). The incidence of conflict can be reduced by policies abating cultural barriers, fostering inter-ethnic trade and human capital, and shifting beliefs. Coercive peace policies, such as peacekeeping forces or externally imposed regime changes, have no enduring effects.

show abstract

Reputation, group structure and social tensions

Cited by 26 publications

References 78 publications

War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict

War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict

On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict

War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust, and Conflict

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