Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision Making of Power Battery Considering Subsidy Transfer under EPR System

Abstract

With new energy vehicles becoming the mainstream of new vehicles sold, the surge in user ownership has triggered a wave of power battery scrapping, and the environmental problems caused by improper power battery recycling are becoming more serious. It is essential to promote the development of the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) of power batteries effectively through government subsidies under the extended producer responsibility (EPR) regime. Combining the EPR system with the battery manufacturer as the leader and the vehicle manufacturer and the retailer as the subordinates, this paper constructs and solves four models of different CLSC subsidy objects and analyzes the pricing of power batteries by different subsidy objects by using the Stackelberg game, as well as the profit change and profit distribution ratio of each CLSC participant. The results of the study showed: (1) when the unit subsidy is limited, the government should subsidize all the CLSC subjects as much as possible. (2) When the government subsidizes the remanufacturing of power batteries, the recycling rate of power batteries is higher, and the benefits of the CLSC are better than those of subsidizing other actors. (3) The change in government subsidy objects will not affect the profit distribution ratio of CLSC, mainly because the subsidy not only improves the recovery rate, but also improves the profitability of each entity.

Research on Power Battery Recycling in the Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Analysis

“…On the factors affecting recycling, according to some scholars, power battery recycling can be influenced by recycling policies and incentives, such as subsidies [15,16]. Government subsidies can influence the price of recycling, which in turn provides a positive incentive for recycling behavior [17].…”

Multi‐agent behavioral strategy game and synergy evolution path of the retired power battery recycling system

“…Ding et al (2020) consider subsidies for the collecting firm and the dismantling firm and investigate the optimal collection decision of a stylized model and the optimal kind of subsidy. Shen et al (2022) construct a three‐echelon closed‐loop supply chain, where the battery manufacturer is a leader and the vehicle manufacturer and the retailer are followers, and put forward four kinds of subsidies on different objects. They investigate how these subsidies affect the operations management of closed‐loop supply chain and compare these four kinds of subsidies.…”

A Study of Electronic Product Supply Chain Decisions Considering Quality Control and Cross-Channel Returns

“…Liu et al [40] established a Stackelberg model composed of a recycler and a manufacturer to study the impact of recycling waste products on sales. Shen et al [41] constructed a variety of subsidy recovery models and analyzed the impact of different subsidy objects on supply chain decisions using the Stackelberg game. Peng et al [42] used Stackelberg game knowledge to build a low-carbon supply chain model and verified the correlation between supply chain decision and government low-carbon subsidies.…”