Research on Optimization of Array Honeypot Defense Strategies Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Abstract

Honeypot has been regarded as an active defense technology that can deceive attackers by simulating real systems. However, honeypot is actually a static network trap with fixed disposition, which is easily identified by anti-honeypot technology. Thus, honeypot is a “passive” active defense technology. Dynamic honeypot makes up for the shortcomings of honeypot, which dynamically adjusts defense strategies with the attack of hackers. Therefore, the confrontation between defenders and attackers is a strategic game. This paper focuses on the non-cooperative evolutionary game mechanism of bounded rationality, aiming to improve the security of the array honeypot system through the evolutionarily stable strategies derived from the evolutionary game model. First, we construct a three-party evolutionary game model of array honeypot, which is composed of defenders, attackers and legitimate users. Secondly, we formally describe the strategies and revenues of players in the game, and build the three-party game payoff matrices. Then the evolutionarily stable strategy is obtained by analyzing the Replicator Dynamics of various parties. In addition, we discuss the equilibrium condition to get the influence of the number of servers N on the stability of strategy evolution. MATLAB and Gambit simulation experiment results show that deduced evolutionarily stable strategies are valid in resisting attackers.

Leveraging Computational Intelligence Techniques for Defensive Deception: A Review, Recent Advances, Open Problems and Future Directions

“…Deception-based defenses are potent weapons that have been proven to work in various domains. Their efficacy is based on the fact that they are programmed to exploit key biases to appear realistic but misleading substitutes to the hidden reality [ 79 , 80 , 81 , 82 , 83 , 84 , 85 , 86 , 87 , 88 , 89 , 90 , 91 , 92 , 93 , 94 , 95 , 96 , 97 , 98 , 99 , 100 , 101 , 102 , 103 , 104 , 105 , 106 , 107 , 108 ]. As a result, one will require a thorough understanding of both offensive and defensive trickery to implement a perfect Deception strategy.…”

A Study on the Incentive Policy of China’s Prefabricated Residential Buildings Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

“…According to the analysis method of local stability of the Jacobi matrix, it can be seen that when the equilibrium point satisfies the determinant Det j > 0 and trace Tr j < 0; it shows that the system is in a local gradual stable state during dynamic evolution. This point is regarded as the system's local evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) [31]. According to the above equation, Det j and Tr j at each equilibrium point are as shown in Table 4.…”

The Influence of Government’s Economic Management Strategies on the Prefabricated Buildings Promoting Policies: Analysis of Quadripartite Evolutionary Game

“…Evolutionary game theory, developed from biological evolutionary theory, is a complement to game theory. Its strategies can replace mixed strategies in game theory by a percentage of group selection [47], which analyzes the different strategies adopted by individuals in the model [48,49].…”

“…The point is called 'Evolutionary Stability Strategy'(ESS) [48] point only when all the eigenvalues are negative, which means the dynamic evolution is stable. In this paper, the analysis of the value and stability condition of equilibrium point in replication dynamic system of quadripartite evolutionary game are shown in Tables 2 and 3.…”