Resisting the historical objections to realism: Is Doppelt’s a viable solution?

Alai, Mario

doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1087-z

Cited by 18 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…They are Bohr and Heisenberg's 5 "Copenhagen" interpretation, De Broglie's "double solution", Wigner's theory of the collapse as produced by conscience, relational quantum mechanics, statistical quantum mechanics, informational interpretations and informational ontologies, modal interpretations, and the coherent histories interpretations. 6 These interpretations are in principle absolutely EE. Thirdly, there are (c) alternative and incompatible formalisms, which introduce different laws or equations: Bohmian mechanics, the objective collapse theories, the many branching universes or branching spacetime theories, temporally symmetric theories, decoherence theories, quantum field theory.…”

Section: The "Empirical Underdetermination" Argument Against Realismmentioning

confidence: 98%

The Underdetermination of Theories and Scientific Realism

Alai

2018

Axiomathes

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The empirical underdetermination of theories is a philosophical problem which until the last century has not seriously troubled actual science. The reason is that confirmation does not depend only on empirical consequences, and we can choose among empirically equivalent theories on the basis of theoretical virtues. True, in current quantum mechanics not even theoretical virtues allow to choose among many competing theories and interpretations, but this is because none of them possess those virtues to a sufficient degree. However, first, we can hope for some advancement in the state of the art: in past history we never witnessed unsolvable scientific problems. Second, even if no further progress came forth, all the most credited competitors agree on a substantial core of theoretical assumptions. Therefore underdetermination does not show that we cannot be realist on unobservable entities in general, but at most that in particular fields our inquiry may encounter some de facto limits. Realism is not a claim of omniscience: since the reality we know is subjectindependent, gaps or mistakes are always possible in principle.

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Section: The "Empirical Underdetermination" Argument Against Realismmentioning

confidence: 98%

The Underdetermination of Theories and Scientific Realism

Alai

2018

Axiomathes

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“…The English argument for realism is useful in overcoming Müller's (2015) and Alai's (2017) objection to realism that realists have the burden of showing that unlike past theories, current theories are successful enough to show that they are true. The degree of success of past theories was below a certain point that I called "the flipping point" in Subsection 2.4.3 of Chap.…”

Section: The English Notion Of Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Six New Arguments for Scientific Realism

Park

2021

Embracing Scientific Realism

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I introduce the following six new arguments for realism, all of which radically differ from the no-miracles argument. The optimistic induction over realists holds that since the realists of the early twentieth century were right to believe the theories of their time, their present and future philosophical offspring are also right to believe the theories of their times. The argument from undiscovered evidence holds that because T has been supported by previously undiscovered evidence, it will continue to be supported by hitherto undiscovered evidence. The argument from neighboring theories holds that since T has been reinforced by previously unconceived neighboring theories, it will continue to be reinforced by hitherto unconceived neighboring theories. The counter-induction for realism asserts that since earlier theories were ousted, their present successors will not be ousted. The English argument for realism holds that under the English notion of rationality, it is rational to believe T, although it is also rational not to believe T. These five new arguments for realism entitle us to construct a second-order argument for scientific realism that I call "the grand optimistic induction." It holds that since realism has been supported by the five previously unconceived arguments, it will continue to be supported by hitherto unconceived arguments.

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“…Empirical progressivism has begun to receive probing criticisms from philosophers. K. Brad Wray (2013) and Mario Alai (2017) contend that current theories, although more successful than their predecessors, will suffer the same fate. To justify this contention, they have constructed a new PI, which I call the relative pessimistic induction (RPI).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Absolute and Relative Pessimistic Inductions

Park

2019

PRB

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[full article, abstract in English; abstract in Lithuanian] The absolute pessimistic induction states that earlier theories, although successful, were abandoned, so current theories, although successful, will also be abandoned. By contrast, the relative pessimistic induction states that earlier theories, although superior to their predecessors, were discarded, so current theories, although superior to earlier theories, will also be discarded. Some pessimists would have us believe that the relative pessimistic induction avoids empirical progressivism. I argue, however, that it has the same problem as the absolute pessimistic induction, viz., either its premise is implausible or its conclusion does not probably follow from its premise.

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Resisting the historical objections to realism: Is Doppelt’s a viable solution?

Cited by 18 publications

References 30 publications

The Underdetermination of Theories and Scientific Realism

The Underdetermination of Theories and Scientific Realism

Six New Arguments for Scientific Realism

The Absolute and Relative Pessimistic Inductions

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