Respecting all the evidence

Sliwa, Paulina; Horowitz, Sophie

doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0446-9

Cited by 66 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…For we should expect that if Aisha has a 0.99 credence in G, as the steadfaster recommends, she will almost certainly have a 0.99 credence in the truth. After all, we are imagining that the configuration of the plane, as described by Aisha's evidence E, 2 Some calibrationists include Christensen (2010), Sliwa and Horowitz (2015), Vavova (forthcoming) and Elga (ms). 3 The name comes from the related debate about how we ought to respond to peer disagreement (see Christensen (2010) for a discussion of the connections between these debates).…”

Section: Why Higher Order Evidence Is Puzzlingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… Some calibrationists include Christensen (), Sliwa and Horowitz (), Vavova (forthcoming) and Elga (ms). …”

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confidence: 99%

“… The proposition that you judge is the proposition from the relevant partition (in our case: {G,~G}) that you were (or would be) most confident in on the basis of the first order evidence alone. I borrow this term from Sliwa and Horowitz () and Weatherson (ms). …”

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confidence: 99%

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An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence

Schoenfield

2016

Philos Phenomenol Research

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The aim of this paper is to apply the accuracy based approach to epistemology to the case of higher order evidence: evidence that bears on the rationality of one's beliefs. I proceed in two stages. First, I show that the accuracy based framework that is standardly used to motivate rational requirements supports steadfastness—a position according to which higher order evidence should have no impact on one's doxastic attitudes towards first order propositions. The argument for this will require a generalization of an important result by Greaves and Wallace for the claim that conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy. The generalization I provide will, among other things, allow us to apply the result to cases of self‐locating evidence. In the second stage, I develop an alternative framework. Very roughly, what distinguishes the traditional approach from the alternative one is that, on the traditional picture, we're interested in evaluating the expected accuracy of conforming to an update procedure. On the alternative picture that I develop, instead of considering how good an update procedure is as a plan to conform to, we consider how good it is as a plan to make. I show how, given the use of strictly proper scoring rules, the alternative picture vindicates calibrationism: a view according to which higher order evidence should have a significant impact on our beliefs. I conclude with some thoughts about why higher order evidence poses a serious challenge for standard ways of thinking about rationality.

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Section: Why Higher Order Evidence Is Puzzlingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… Some calibrationists include Christensen (), Sliwa and Horowitz (), Vavova (forthcoming) and Elga (ms). …”

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confidence: 99%

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An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence

Schoenfield

2016

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…If Matt were sure that his credence is rational, then perhaps 20 For defenses or sympathetic discussion of the claim that it is irrational to maintain some credence or belief when you acquire evidence that it is irrational, see Christensen (2010) 21 It is Schoenfield's discussion of irrelevant influences on belief that makes explicit that she endorses only the weaker version of Intrapersonal Uniqueness. She's interested in cases where you learn that your belief was influenced by an irrelevant factor.…”

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confidence: 99%

Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism

Schultheis

2017

Mind

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“…Feldman, ; Bergmann, ; White, ; and Sliwa and Horowitz, forthcoming. Wietmarschen (, p. 415) has also endorsed something akin to (NoHOE) in an attempt to resolve the debate over conciliationism in the epistemology of disagreement.…”

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confidence: 99%

How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher‐Order Evidence

Silva

2016

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Certain plausible evidential requirements and coherence requirements on rationality seem to yield dilemmas of rationality (in a specific, objectionable sense) when put together with the possibility of misleading higher‐order evidence. Epistemologists have often taken such dilemmas to be evidence that we're working with some false principle. In what follows I show how one can jointly endorse an evidential requirement, a coherence requirement, and the possibility of misleading higher‐order evidence without running afoul of dilemmas of rationality. The trick lies in observing the difference between attitudes it is rational to hold (= propositional justification) and rationally holding those attitudes (= doxastic justification).

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Respecting all the evidence

Cited by 66 publications

References 19 publications

An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence

An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence

Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism

How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher‐Order Evidence

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