Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation

Abstract

Philosophers of science typically associate the causal-mechanical view of scientific explanation with the work of Railton and Salmon. In this paper I shall argue that the defects of this view arise from an inadequate analysis of the concept of mechanism. I contrast Salmon's account of mechanisms in terms of the causal nexus with my own account of mechanisms, in which mechanisms are viewed as complex systems. After describing these two concepts of mechanism, I show how the complex-systems approach avoids certain objections to Salmon's account of causal-mechanical explanation. I conclude by discussing how mechanistic explanations can provide understanding by unification.

Thinking about evolutionary mechanisms: natural selection

“…Two conceptions of mechanism are at the forefront of the new mechanistic philosophy, one developed by Glennan, and the other by the team of Machamer, Darden, and Craver (hereafter MDC) (Glennan , 2002a(Glennan , 2002bMDC 2000). In the present section, we set out Glennan's and MDC's conceptions of mechanism to set the stage for our analysis of natural Skipper/Millstein, "Evolutionary Mechanisms", p. 8 of 38 selection as a mechanism in section (4) below.…”

“…One aspect of Glennan's view that has remained constant over time is his insistence that a mechanism is always for a behavior; i.e., when we identify a mechanism, we always identify what that mechanism does (Glennan , 1997(Glennan , 2002a(Glennan , 2002b. This seems relatively unproblematic for the mechanism of natural selection; we might, for example, understand stages (III-VII) as things that natural selection does.…”

“…Recall that on MDC's account, the entities "often must be appropriately located, structured, and oriented, and the activities that they engage in must have a temporal order, rate, and duration" (MDC, 2000, p. 3; italics added). Glennan makes a similar, albeit weaker, claim, viz., "mechanisms are systems consisting of relatively stable configurations of parts that give rise to robust behaviors which can be expressed by invariant generalizations" (Glennan, 2002b, p. S348; italics added).…”

“…What we call the new mechanistic philosophy is comprised of two dominant conceptions of mechanism, one due to Glennan ( , 2002aGlennan ( , 2002b) and the other due to the team of Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000). The new mechanistic philosophy has the broad aim of building a philosophical framework for understanding the nature and role of mechanisms in science.…”

Adaptive speciation: the role of natural selection in mechanisms of geographic and non-geographic speciation

“…Complete 16 See, for example, Wimsatt (1976);Brandon (1985Brandon ( , 1996; Woodward (1989Woodward ( , 2002; Glennan (1996Glennan ( , 2002; Salmon (1998); Thagard (1998) ;Machamer, Darden, & Craver (2000); Craver (2001);Tabery (2004); this issue. 17 Machamer, Darden, & Craver (2000), p. 3.…”