Rethinking naive realism

Abstract

Perceptions are externally-directed-they present us with a mind-independent reality, and thus contribute to our abilities to think about this reality, and to know what is objectively the case. But perceptions are also internally-dependenttheir phenomenologies depend on the neuro-computational properties of the subject. A good theory of perception must account for both these facts. But naive realism has been criticized for failing to accommodate internal-dependence. This paper evaluates and responds to this criticism. It first argues that a certain version of naive realism, often called ''selectionism'', does indeed struggle with internal-dependence. It then develops an alternate version of naive realism which does not. This alternate version, inspired by an idea of Martin's, accommodates the internal-dependence of perceptions by recognizing the role that the subject's neuro-computational properties play in shaping perceptual phenomenology. At the same time, it retains the distinctive naive realist account of the external-directedness of perceptions.

Representationalism about Consciousness

“…They cannot accommodate in a plausible way the role of internal neural processing in shaping sensory consciousness. (For discussion, see Logue 2017;Beck 2018;and Campbell 2018. ) By contrast, repre sentationalists can easily accommodate the role of the brain, by accepting an 'internalist' form of representationalism.…”

“…)22 True, our naïve, pretheoretical view of color experi ence may be resolutely externalist. But, given the empirical facts, externalism about color ex peri ence is no more sustainable than externalism about the experience of pain and smell.23 22 For recent discussion of the argument from neuroscience against externalism about the qualities of experience, see Chalmers 2005;Cohen 2009: 81ff;Pautz 2014b;Allen 2016: 71-2;Logue 2017;Beck 2018;Berger 2018;Campbell 2018. 23 There are a few arguments against reductiveexternalist representationalism besides the argument from neuroscience described in the text.…”

Naturalism and the philosophy of colour ontology and perception

“…Adam Pautz challenges the naïve realist claim that the qualitative nature of colour properties is grounded (exclusively) in the physical properties of external objects (SSR), pointing out some empirical facts that suggest there is, in general, “bad external correlation”, that is, no reliable correlation between the similarity relationships of SSR's, and the similarity relationships amongst the colour experiences they elicit, but “good internal correlation”—one can usually predict the similarity relationships amongst subjective experiences by examining the similarity relationships amongst the neural states associated with them (Pautz, :25–6). Beck () has conceded that such empirical findings pose a problem for naïve realists who deny that perceiver dependent factors (such as neuronal activations) play any role in shaping the phenomenal character of perceptual states but that the admission of the role played by subjective factors is consistent with the core tenets of naïve realism.…”

Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl

“…Roughly, then, the experiential aspect of perceiving is supposed to be at least in part "inherited" from objects themselves. Or, more pithily, what the experience is like is a function of what the perceived object itself is like (Fish 2009;Allen 2016; but see Beck 2018). For instance, what explains the redness as a constituent in the phenomenal character of my experience of a red apple is the redness of the apple itself.…”