Rethinking Origin Essentialism (for Artefacts)

Roca-Royes, Sònia

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755722.003.0008

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…But this is a very high price to pay: it is to give up the principle that what is possibly possible is possible (ruling out S5, and even S4, as the background logic for metaphysical modality). 27 In light of these enormous costs, it is often found preferable to conceive of c 0 's flexible essence as fixed rather than shifting (see Williamson 1990;Leslie 2011;Roca-Royes 2016). Understood this way, m 0 is taken to be at the centre of c 0 's range of possible origins with respect to any world.…”

Section: Finean Ontological Dependence Without Necessitationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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In Defence of Hybrid Contingentism

Skiba

2022

Philosophers' Imprint

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Hybrid contingentism combines first-order contingentism, the view that it is contingent what individuals there are, with higher-order necessitism, the view that it is non-contingent what properties and propositions there are (where these are conceived as entities in the range of appropriate higher-order quantifiers). This combination of views avoids the most delicate problems afflicting alternative contingentist positions while preserving the central contingentist claim that ordinary, concrete entities exist contingently. Despite these attractive features, hybrid contingentism is usually faced with rejection. The main reason for this is an objection that crucially involves haecceitistic properties, properties such as being identical to Plato or being identical to Aristotle. The objection alleges that by accepting the necessary existence of such haecceities, hybrid contingentists incur an explanatory commitment that they are unable to discharge, namely that of explaining how it is that certain haecceities ‘lock onto’ their target individuals even when those individuals are absent. To defend hybrid contingentism against this charge, I first clarify the haecceities objection in several respects and consider, in particular, what notion of explanation the objection is operating with. After arguing that it can be fruitfully understood as a challenge to provide metaphysical grounds for certain haecceity facts, I develop a contingentist response to the objection that draws on recent work on the connection between ground and essence.

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Section: Finean Ontological Dependence Without Necessitationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…. It is classified as such byRoca-Royes (2016) and defended e.g. bySalmon (1981),Williamson (1990), andLeslie (2011).…”

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confidence: 99%

In Defence of Hybrid Contingentism

Skiba

2022

Philosophers' Imprint

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Essential bundle theory and modality

Jago

2018

Synthese

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Bundle theories identify material objects with bundles of properties. On the traditional approach, these are the properties possessed by that material object. That view faces a deep problem: it seems to say that all of an object’s properties are essential to it. Essential bundle theory attempts to overcome this objection, by taking the bundle as a specification of the object’s essential properties only. In this paper, I show that essential bundle theory faces a variant of the objection. To avoid the problem, the theory must accept the contingency of identity. I show how this can be achieved in a coherent and well-motivated way, a way that isn’t available to traditional bundle theories.

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The epistemology of modality and the problem of modal epistemic friction

Vaidya

Wallner

2018

Synthese

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There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention over the past 20 years (1998-2018): conceivability-theory, counterfactualtheory, and deduction-theory. In this paper we argue that all three face what we call the problem of modal epistemic friction (PMEF). One consequence of the problem is that for any of the three accounts to yield modal knowledge, the account must provide an epistemology of essence. We discuss an attempt to fend off the problem within the context of the internalism versus externalism debate about epistemic justification. We then investigate the effects that the PMEF has on reductive and non-reductive theories of the relation between essence and modality.

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Rethinking Origin Essentialism (for Artefacts)

Cited by 3 publications

References 6 publications

In Defence of Hybrid Contingentism

In Defence of Hybrid Contingentism

Essential bundle theory and modality

The epistemology of modality and the problem of modal epistemic friction

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